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ARTICLE

Trade's Mini-Deals
KATHLEEN CLAUSSEN

The modern consensus is that U.S. trade law is made through statute and through
large congressional-executive agreements, both of which maintain Congress'constitutional
primacy over the regulation of foreign commerce. Contray to this understanding,
however, short, targeted agreements negotiated by the U.S. executive with foreign trading
partners- recently referred to as "mini-deals"- have become afixture of the trade law
landscape over the last three decades in staggering number. More than 1,200 such
agreementsgovern the movement ofgoods and services in and out of the United States
from and to 130 countries. Such deals are not only now one of the primay ways trade
law is made but also are likely to be the principaltoolfor trade lawmaking in the Biden
Administration. Yet, despite their ubiquity, we know almost nothing about them. This
Article explains how this transformation in U.S. trade law has occurred as a growing
foreign commercial bureaucracybegan to engage readily withforeignpartners.
The Article provides an unprecedented look at trade mini-deals, where they come
from, how they are made, and what they do. The data show a growing reliance by the
executive on mini-deals to achieveforeign commercialgoals in the last thirtyyears and a
significant expansion of their scope in the lastfive years. They are not so "mini"
anymore. The data also reveal that these agreements often slp under the radar of our
ordinay accountability and monitoring regimes and have been missed by prior
scholarship. Their obscurity has enabled them to grow quietly in importance as a means
to achieve trade and regulatorypolicy aims. They have become a preferred tool for good
reason, even if they sufferfrom proceduralflaws.
The picture that emerges from this eview disruptsprior understandings of the
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foreign commerciallegal topography, demonstrating that both the trade and transnational
regulatoy landscapes are much more textured than previously understood. The Article
uses this hand-collected quantitative and qua/itative data set to sketch a more accurate
portrait of how our trade law is made. It argues that such agreements serve constructive
legislative and rulemaking purposes, supplementing statutes and regulations and
sometimes substitutingfor them. The analysispresented here underscores the profound
and cross-cutting bureaucraticauthority acrossforeign relations and the administrative
state. Given the importance of this transnational activity and its implications, the
Article also opens a new field for interdisczplinayscholary research.
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INTRODUCTION
At the center of U.S. trade law is a legal device undernoticed in trade
law scholarship and underestimated in the other legal domains in which it
operates. This tool is critical to regulating the ins and outs of foreign
products in the United States. It is most easily visible in its application.
Consider a foreign tomato. The law applicable to the foreign tomato

coming into the United States includes some U.S. statutes and some
regulations developed by federal agencies through a public rulemaking
process. But major parts of the international produce canon consist of
agreements concluded between the United States and the crop's country of
origin that cover topics as specific as what treatment methods the tomato
receives while still far from your kitchen, its processing and storage, its
labeling and packaging, and under what conditions it may be sold in your
supermarket. These sorts of agreements comprise the backbone of the
rules that govern not just tomatoes, 1 but also trousers, 2 titanium, 3
telecommunications, 4 and much more. Together, they make up a set of
over 1,200 agreements that control the cross-border movement of goods
and services into and out of the United States. And this body of law has

never before been explored.
Recently, commentators have referred to these typically short
executive trade agreements as "mini" or "skinny" trade deals to distinguish
them from large scale free trade agreements (FTAs) that are approved and
implemented by Congress pursuant to now well-known statutory

authorities.s In contrast to FTAs, so-called mini-deals are developed by the
executive alone and occupy a unique place in our foreign relations and
trade laws. The vast majority create binding obligations for U.S.
government actors and private individuals. Made by a handful of different
agencies across the executive branch, these deals are linked by both the
special trade lawmaking process that they usually follow and, more

1 See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding for the Exchange of Information on Exports of
Fresh Tomatoes Between the Secretariat of Economy of the United Mexican States and the
Department of Commerce of the United States of America, Mex.-U.S., Aug. 19-23, 2013,
http://www.economia-snci.gob.mx/sicait/5.0/doctos/MOU_Tomate_InglC3%A9s.pdf
[hereinafter Tomato MOU].
2 See, e.g., Agreement Concerning Trade in Women's and Girls' Wool Trousers, Arg.-U.S., May
14-31, 1991, Hein's No. KAV 2937.
3 See, e.g., Agreement on Reduction of Export Duties on Ferrous and Non-Ferrous Scrap
Products, Ukr.-U.S., Feb. 22, 2006, T.J.A.S. 06-222.
4 See, e.g., Understanding Concerning the Procurement Procedures for Telecommunications
Equipment in Korea, S. Kor.-US., Mar. 29-Apr. 10, 1995, Hein's No. KAV 5190.
5 See, e.g., Testimony of U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer, House Ways & Means
Comm., C-SPAN (June 17, 2020), https://www.c-span.org/video/?473040-1/house-ways-meanscommittee-hearing-trade-policy [hereinafter Lighthizer Testimony 2020].
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importantly, by the fact that they regulate the movement of goods and

services into and out of the United States.
That any foreign commercial deals could be negotiated and
implemented by the executive alone is a departure from traditional
understandings of the separation of trade law powers under the U.S.
Constitution. 6 Those traditional understandings would point to
congressional-executive agreements as the primary trade law tool since
1995. Generally, the professional consensus is that, apart from the
imposition of tariffs, trade law is made through a remarkably successful
dual-branch process constructed in 1974 and applied to its greatest extent
in the last 25 years beginning with the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA). 7 Yet, in the last decade, only one trade agreement
has been made through the congressional-executive agreement process:
the update to the NAFTA known in the United States as the United States
- Mexico - Canada Agreement (USMCA). 8 By contrast, in 2020 alone, 32
of these trade-related executive agreements entered into force governing
everything from steel to nuts. 9 The institutional arrangements for our
separation of trade law powers have dramatically changed.
This Article is the first to note this feature of trade lawmaking in the
United States and its implications. To do so, the Article takes stock of the
many agreements that fall in this category. As detailed below, I have
collected and reviewed more than 1,200 of these trade-related executive
agreements to understand what they do, how they are part of U.S. law, and
what processes and principles apply to their making and their maintenance.
Surprisingly, almost no research has examined this piece of trade law
governance - these agreements' content, scope, the relationships they
create, their authority, or their institutional or economic impact. We know
almost nothing about them - until now. What emerges in this first look is
an astonishing array of agreements dictating broad swathes of economic
law. Despite being underappreciated, these agreements are everywhere.
They are often legislative and regulatory devices in unfamiliar clothes.
They supplement statutes and regulations and also sometimes substitute
for and purport to override them. 10 They fill the space between our
administrative state and the global marketplace.
Given their expansion and their constitutional consequence, it is
misleading to call them "mini" or "skinny" at all. I adopt here the term
6 See infra Part I.A.
7 CATHLEEN D. CIMINO-ISAACS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45148, U.S. TRADE POLICY PRIMER:
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 27 (2021).
8 See id. at 34 fig. 14.
9 See infra Part II.A.
10 See discussion infra Part I.B; see also Kathleen Claussen, Regulating Foreign Commerce Through
Multiple Pathways: A Case Study, 130 YALE L.J. F. 266, 278-80 (2020) [hereinafter Claussen, Multiple
Pathways].
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"trade executive agreements" (TEAs) to capture more accurately the work
that these agreements are doing and their notable unilateral origins. This
Article begins the conversation about the legal regime that governs their
life cycle - their authority, their making, their application (or lack thereof),
and even their eventual fade from prominence. In addition to their
separation-of-trade-law-powers complications, TEAs are special among
traditional notions of "executive agreements" 11 because they are made
through a process entirely apart from other executive agreements. Strategic
agency organizational design choices have enabled TEAs to flourish. And,
when studied closely, these deals can be seen to make important

contributions to trade and regulation.
When you consider TEAs' ubiquity, their obscurity seems all the more
perplexing. Most of these deals fly under the radar of legislative and public
attention, despite that they have been used in one form or another by
presidents and agencies for more than a century. 12 In 2019 and 2020, some
renewed congressional attention to TEA practice emerged when the
Trump Administration entered into multiple TEAs with four of the United
States' largest trading partners, including among those TEAs what is
known as the "Phase One China Deal." 13 Touting the Deal as a major
victory in the "trade war," the Administration emphasized its use of TEAs
as part of the executive trade law arsenal. 14 Or, take the recent U.S. trade
agreement with Japan. 15 On the surface, this agreement created reciprocal
market access for certain agricultural and industrial goods by reducing
tariffs on 241 categories of products coming from Japan, but it went
11 This includes what some scholars would call ex ante congressional-executive agreements in
which Congress has delegated authority to the executive to enter into an agreement without a
requirement that Congress see the final product. Like others, I do not distinguish between ex ante
congressional-executive agreements and sole executive agreements, but I note where the absence of
distinction can be problematic. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties' End: The Past, Present, and Future of
International La-making in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1257 (2007-2008) [hereinafter
Hathaway, Treat/es' End|. Other important general studies of executive agreements acknowledge that
some such agreements relate to trade; those studies concentrate on the constitutional authority
underlying such agreements. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control over
InternationalLan, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1207-08 (2017); Oona A. Hathaway, PresidentialPower over
InternationalLaw: Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE L.J. 140, 258 (2009) [hereinafter Hathaway, Presidential

Po el.
12 See Hathaway, Treaties'End, supranote 11, at 1289-90.
13 Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the
Government of the People's Republic of China, China-U.S., Jan. 15, 2020, https://ustr.gov
/sites/default/ files/ files/ agreements/phase-one-agreement/ Economic_And_TradeAgreement_
BetweenTheUnited_States_And_China_Text.pdf [hereinafter 2020 China Deal]. The other trading
partners are Canada, Mexico, and Japan. I take up each relevant agreement in the following pages.
14 See, e.g., Lighthizer Testimony 2020, supra note 5 (described in greater detail at Part III);
Interview with USTR official 6, via Zoom (Nov. 4, 2020) (commenting that a recently concluded
TEA with Brazil was an ordinary part of the executive trade toolkit).
15 Trade Agreement Between the United States of America and Japan, Japan-U.S., Oct. 7, 2019,
https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/japan-korea-apec/japan/us-japan-trade-agreementnegotiations/us-japan-trade-agreement-text [hereinafter Japan-U.S. Trade Agreement].
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farther. In two annexes, it developed 78 pages of rules regarding the
specifications of products and services that can flow in either direction. 16
In seven exchanges of letters negotiated apart from the principal
agreement, it set out new arrangements with Japan on products like beef,
rice, and alcoholic beverages. 17 A further "side agreement" on digital trade
prohibits certain taxes on digital products, disallows data localization
measures, and guarantees consumer privacy protections, among other
obligations. 1 8
The Trump Administration brought TEAs to the fore but puzzlingly
little has been asked by members of Congress about where they came from
and how far they can go. 19 Similarly, outside observers and academics have
barely questioned their provenance and are largely unaware of TEAs'
impact on the constitutional, regulatory, and bureaucratic landscapes. This
Article excavates TEAs to discern answers to these questions. It does so

16 Id.
17 Exchange of Letters Regarding Alcoholic Beverages, Japan-U.S., Oct. 7, 2019,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/japan/LetterExchangeon_Alcoholic_Bevera
ges.pdf;
Exchange
of
Letters
Regarding
Beef,
Japan-U.S.,
Oct.
7,
2019,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/japan/LetterExchangeonBeef.pdf;
Exchange
of
Letters
Regarding
Rice,
Japan-U.S.,
Oct.
7,
2019,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/japan/LetterExchangeonRice.pdf;
Exchange of Letters Regarding Agricultural Safeguard Measures, Japan-U.S., Oct. 7, 2019,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/japan/LetterExchangeonSafeguards.pdf;
Exchange of Letters Regarding Skimmed Milk Powder, Japan-U.S.,
Oct.
7, 2019,
https:/ /ustr.gov/ sites/default/files/files/ agreements/japan/LetterExchangeon_Skimmed_Milk_
Powder.pdf;
Exchange
of
Letters
Regarding
Whey,
Japan-U.S.,
Oct.
7,
2019,
https:/ /ustr.gov/sites /default/ flies/ files/agreements/japan/ LetterExchangeonWhey.pdf;
Exchange of Letters Regarding Interactive Computer Services, Japan-U.S., Oct. 7, 2019,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/japan/LetterExchangeon_Interactive_Com
puterServices.pdf.
18 Agreement Between the United States of America and Japan Concerning Digital Trade,
Japan-U.S., Oct. 7, 2019, https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/japan-korea-apec/japan/us-japan-tradeagreement-negotiations/us-japan-digital-trade-agreement-text [hereinafter Japan-U.S. Digital Trade
Agreement].
19 Some members of Congress questioned the Trump Administration's use of mini-deals with
China, Japan, and Ecuador. See, e.g., Letter from Members of the U.S. House of Representatives to
USTR Robert Lighthizer (Dec. 9, 2020) (criticizing the USTR for negotiating and concluding a deal
with Ecuador without congressional consultation); Rep. Murphy: U.S.-Japan Deal 'Badfor our National
Security,' INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept. 11, 2020 (quoting Rep. Murphy: "It is unworthy of our
relationship with Japan just to have some sort of 'mini-deal' .... It's substandard for everybody and
not only is it bad for our economy, it's bad for our national security and national-regional stability.");
Isabelle Icso, Blumenauer, Kind Assess TPA Renenal Prospects, Election Ram cations, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
Sept. 11, 2020 (noting that the administration used or planned to use a statutory "loophole" for minideals with Japan, China, India and Brazil). Little came of these brief criticisms. In fact, on other
occasions, members have expressed support. Isabelle Icso, La makers Callon USTR, USDA to Strike
Broad Phase-To Deal nith Japan, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, July 10, 2020; Isabelle Icso, Rep. Sevel Suggests
Skinny' Digital Deals Could be Struck nith Australia, Singapore, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, June 26, 2020
[hereinafter Icso, Skinny Deals]; Alex Lawson, U.S. and BraiLAimingfor Eary-Stage Trade Pact This Year,
LAw360 (Apr. 17, 2020, 6:22 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1265058/us-and-brazilaiming-for-early-stage-trade-pact-this-year.
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with some urgency. More TEAs are on the way. 20 Certain TEA delegations
from Congress to the president will be under reconsideration in the
coming year as they are scheduled to expire. 21 To fill the void at this
critical juncture, this Article takes a comprehensive look at these
instruments to conceptualize this constitutional moment with quantitative
and qualitative force.
Ultimately, the biggest obstacle to studying TEAs is finding them. A
key aim of this project is to provide some solid empirical grounding for an
analysis of these instruments, but to do so based on the agreements that
are publicly available. Approaching my search for TEAs this way produced
striking and unanticipated results. My team discovered hundreds of
agreements that were mentioned on public websites but only readily
available through subscription services; other hundreds were mentioned
only in subscription services; and still others were in the public sphere but

missed by subscription services. In some instances, trade agreements into
which the United States has entered are not available anywhere, including
from the U.S. government. Executive branch agency recordkeeping,
awareness or, perhaps better put, confusion and transparency are major
contributing problems. Given the challenges that I describe below, we can
safely assume that the 1,225 agreements reviewed here are just the tip of
the iceberg.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explains the notion of a TEA
and accounts for how such an instrument can exist when the Constitution
assigns trade governance to Congress, not the executive. I elaborate on
how these agreements emerged from the practices of our foreign
commerce bureaucracy, while scholars and lawmakers were overly
concentrated on the congressional-executive agreements. This Part sets
out a taxonomy of TEAs that categorizes these deals according to the
types of commitments they create for governments and for private parties.
It also draws on interviews with government officials to peel back the
layers of the institutional design that has facilitated the executive branch's
reliance on TEAs to do trade business. I take up how such agreements are
actually made, rather than what scholarship and even statute would
suggest. These organizational distinctions structurally favor the rise of
TEAs, while also allowing TEAs to slip through the oversight cracks. Part
I's overview of the TEA tapestry reveals how TEAs are distinct from
other executive agreements in their constitutional positioning, their unique

20 See, e.g., Is abelle Ic so, India's Trade Minister Hopes to Negotiate Fresh' Package with Biden, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Feb. 19, 2021 [hereinafter Icso, India]; Isabelle Icso, Anaysts Veigh Benefits, Dra backs of
Sectoral' Trade Deals, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Feb. 5, 2021; Marc L. Busch, Biden's Pre-Trnp Language on
Trade Needs Updating, THE HILL (Aug. 10, 2020,

8:00 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/

international/ 511231-bidens-pre-trump-language-on-trade-needs-updating.
21 19 U.S.C. 4202(a)(1)(A)(ii).
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common content, and the similar process through which they are
formulated.
Drawing together this body of law exposes patterns in with whom,
where, and when TEAs are used. Part II provides these analytics. I
introduce a descriptive account of this original data set of TEAs dating
back to the nation's founding. TEAs have been a consistent feature in the
trade law landscape for several decades, but they exploded into the
administrative space as non-tariff barriers to trade became part of the trade
portfolio beginning in the late 1990s. 22 For this reason, the study
concentrates the greatest attention on these modern TEAs and their
particularities. It documents the characteristics of TEAs - their numbers,
their size and impact, their concentration in individual sectors, and their
partner countries.
Part II also develops possible explanations as to precisely when these
instruments are chosen, and on what grounds or for what reasons. An
alliterative trio of rationalizations surfaces. Trends in TEAs appear to be
the result of bureaucratic bundling, natural proliferation (what I call
informally a bunny effect), and experimentation as building blocks for
future large-scale deals. Further, TEAs circumvent tricky questions
regarding their status in U.S. law by applying bootstrapping strategies.
Part III turns to the normative and prescriptive takeaways of this
research. It evaluates and assesses TEAs, considering some of the costs of
employing these tools as well as the countervailing benefits. TEAs are
widely - and rightly - accepted as making valuable contributions to U.S.
trade and trade law but have recently come under greater scrutiny for the
trade-offs they create, as well as for the questionable legal authority on
which some of them stand. Accordingly, this Part turns to ways TEAs
could be better institutionalized to account for their approval in form, but
their problems in process. It buttresses the case in favor of these belowthe-radar agreements, arguing that their work should neither be
overlooked nor heavily reconsidered. I maintain that we need these
instruments, but that we might consider and treat them differently,
including in the law. I then turn to how future trade and administrative
institution architects might make modifications for more optimal
governance and how, in the short term, some of the accountability issues

may be tempered.
Finally, Part IV discusses how this unprecedented look at TEAs ought
to trigger a modification of existing paradigms across multiple legal
systems. One lesson from this study is that otherwise siloed areas of law
are more interwoven through the work of TEAs than previously
recognized. TEAs introduce a set of pressing trade law questions, but they
22 See discussion infra Part .A.
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also intervene in longstanding debates about how the United States enters
into binding arrangements with other countries - from a constitutional
perspective and as a matter of statutory delegation. TEAs challenge the

dominant

conversations

about

distributions

of

authority

and the

incorporation of foreign commitments into U.S. law. Likewise, TEAs
reorient our visions for ongoing conversations in administrative law: what
that body of law does and what it can or should do. The Article concludes
by reflecting prospectively on what additional work needs to be done
across more than a half dozen legal and social scientific areas.
Given that TEAs occupy a central role in foreign-facing agency
activity, understanding them and their surrounding legal context is vital to
projects of U.S. and international law. Until now, we have missed these
executive branch policymaking levers in language, law, and literature, but
this Article starts to fill the gap. Rightly so, since TEAs are the primary
means through which the executive branch regulates the foreign
commerce of the United States.

I. THE LEGAL & ETYMOLOGICAL REGIMES
When the United States concluded two recent trade-related deals with
Japan, 23 news outlets struggled with what to call them. Partly connected to
tariffs, partly connected to technology and intellectual property, were they
"trade agreements"? They did not look like the other recently concluded
trade agreement about which the media knew, the USMCA.24 A press
release from the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) said that
Japan and the United States "reached agreement on early achievements

from negotiations."

25

The mall Street Journal reported that President Trump

and President Abe signed a "trade-enhancement agreement." 26 In fact, the
Japan deals were neither new nor quite the same as those that had come
before them. But the uncertainty surrounding these two agreements
extended beyond the vocabulary applied to them. We also lacked the
theoretical and structural background to be able to compartmentalize and

23 Japan-U.S. Trade Agreement, supra note 15; Japan-U.S. Digital Trade Agreement, supra note
18.
24 Agreement Between the United States of America, the United Mexican States, and Canada,
July 1, 2020, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canadaagreement/ agreement-between.
25 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Fact Sheet on Japan-U.S. Trade
Agreement (Sept. 25, 2019), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/
2019/september/fact-sheet-us-japan-trade-agreement.
26 Vivian Salama & Josh Zumbrun, U.S., Japan Reach Trade Deal on Farm Goods, Digital Trade,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-japan-sign-trade-deal-givingamerican-food-products-more-access11569430694#:-:text=President%20Trump%20and%20Japan's%20Prime,%2D%20and%20third%2
Dlargest%20economies.
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discuss them. This project aims to resolve the language predicament by
introducing the term "trade executive agreement" in place of the colloquial
"mini-deal," "skinny deal," or the indiscriminate "sectoral deal" - terms
that have been deployed of late - and to begin a conversation on how we
should think about these instruments and the legal issues they pose.
"Trade executive agreement" as I use the term refers to a written
commitment between the United States and another country that relates to

cross-border movement of goods and services and that has not been

-

subject to congressional approval between its negotiation and its entry into
force. That definition merits greater exploration, however, because the
boundaries of each of those concepts can be hazy or even contested.
TEAs do not fit the traditional molds. They are not FTAs 27 ; they are not
sole executive agreements 28 ; and they are not rules issued by agencies
even if they purport to act as each of those. TEAs are understudied in part
because of their Venn-like cartography, operating across not just trade but
also foreign relations and administrative law.

A. Of ConstitutionalOxymorons
Foreign commerce is expressly and unmistakably a congressional
prerogative according to Article I of the Constitution. 29 Article II assigns
treaty authority, apart from the advice and consent of the Senate, to the
president. 30 For many years, this duality left trade treaties in legal limbo. If
foreign commerce is assigned to Congress, and treaties are assigned
principally to the executive, who has the first and last word on treaties
related to foreign commerce? That conflict appeared to many to be
resolved with the development of a shared congressional-executive process
in 1974, known as the fast-track process. 31 In the fast-track process, the
27 "Free trade agreement" is typically reserved for agreements that purport to bring
substantially all tariffs on goods between two or more countries down to zero. See General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, pt. III art. XXIV, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
28 See generaly Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV. 1573,
1581-82 (2007) (defining the term). See also Daniel Bodansky & Peter Spiro, Executive Agreements+, 49
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 885, 892-93 (2016) (citing Clark and expanding upon the basic typology
that has arisen among foreign relations scholars for descriptive and normative purposes). TEAs as
discussed in greater detail below do not rely solely on executive authority in most instances. Rather,
TEAs are typically negotiated pursuant to delegated authority, even if stretching its limits.
29 U.S. CONST. art. I, 8, cl. 1, cl. 3. See also Timothy Meyer & Ganesh Sitaraman, Trade and the
Separation of Powers, 107 CAL. L. REV. 583, 586-97 (2019); Kathleen Claussen, Separation of Trade Lay
Powers, 43 YALE J. INT'L L. 315, 316-20 (2018); Harold H. Koh, Congressional Contols on Presidential
Trade PoliymakingafterI.N.S. v. Chadha, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'LL. &POL. 1191, 1191 (1986).
30 U.S. CONST. art. II,
2, cl. 2. See also Duncan B. Hollis, An Intersubjective Treaty Power, 90
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1415, 1418 (2015).
31 See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constit'tional?, 108 HARv. L. REv. 799,
803 (1995) ("The Trade Act of 1974 made a comprehensive effort to restructure the modern twoHouse procedure to suit the needs of economic diplomacy. This framework has proved remarkably
successful - to the point where it is now taken for granted by all foreign-trade professionals.").
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constitutional impasse is managed by allowing the executive to negotiate
with congressional direction and consultation what would be the treaty,
now called an agreement, and reserving for both houses of Congress ex
post approval and implementation rights. 32 But this research shows that
that constitutional account of trade agreements is incomplete. The United
States has entered into 15 FTAs through fast-track, 33 but it has entered
into hundreds of trade agreements not approved or implemented by
Congress, as this Article shows.
If trade belongs to Congress, then "trade" "executive" agreements
appear at first to be a constitutional oxymoron absent some other
delegation of authority. 34 Indeed, Congress has granted permission on
occasion for the president to enter into some TEAs within narrow
parameters. 35 On other occasions, however, an ex ante delegation is not
obvious or may be debatable. 36 Apart from debates as to their authority,
what is significant for both definitional and analytical purposes is that
there are hundreds of trade-related agreements not approved by Congress
post-negotiation regardless of their legislative or regulatory effects. The
fact that these agreements are concluded by the executive without ex post
congressional approval does not make them exceptional among U.S.
international agreements more generally. Executive agreements have been
the primary international lawmaking medium of the U.S. government for
many years. 37 But TEAs' constitutional positioning sets them apart - as
does their common function: regulating foreign commerce. It is this
shared work of TEAs that most strongly justifies viewing them as a

32 See generally IAN FERGUSSON & CHRISTOPHER DAVIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43491, TRADE
PROMOTION AUTHORITY (TPA): FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, 3 (JUNE 21, 2019). Discerning
trade scholars will rightly note that fast-track also includes a limited carveout for executive
agreements related to tariff adjustments. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. 4202(a). Those tariff barrier agreements
comprise a very small set of the broader universe of TEAs discussed here.
33

OFF.

OF

THE

U.S.

TRADE

REPRESENTATIVE,

FREE

TRADE

AGREEMENTS,

https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements; FERGUSSON & DAVIS, supra note 32, at 4.
34 The one court that has had occasion to consider squarely the constitutionality of a trade
agreement negotiated solely by the executive confirmed that the president cannot conclude traderelated agreements on the basis of his inherent authority. United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204
F.2d 655, 658 (4th Cir. 1953) (holding that a sole executive agreement on trade was void).
35 For an overview of many congressional delegations on trade, see the House of
Representatives' compilation. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 113TH CONG.,
COMPILATION OF U.S. TRADE STATUTES (Comm. Print 2013). Not all of these provide delegations
for agreements; in fact, only a handful do.
36 None of these agreements is express about the authority according to which it was
concluded or implemented. See Oona A. Hathaway, Curtis A. Bradley, & Jack L. Goldsmith, The
Failed Transparency Regime for Executive Agreements: An Empitcal and Normative Analysis, 134 HARV. L.
REV. 629 (2020), at pt. III. I have included in my collection all of these categories: agreements that
fall within recognized delegated congressional authority; agreements for which delegated authority is
not expressly identified or known; and, agreements pursued without congressional delegation or that
appear to go beyond existing delegations.
37 See sources discussed supra note 19.
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separate category. TEAs muddy the waters in the distribution of trade
authority across the branches.
My coining the term "TEA" is reflective of our deficient legal
vocabulary for these instruments that have grown largely out of practice.
TEAs are underappreciated entries in the statutory encyclopedia of trade
tools. 38 But they are not entirely unheard of. When questioned, executive
branch officials have defended the development of TEAs as implicit in
their agency mandates. 39 Such comments raise a fundamental governance
question as to the limits of what the executive does or can do using a TEA
- a question that, like most surrounding these instruments, has not been
subjected to any recent judicial or scholarly testing, but which the next

Section probes. 40
B.

The Category and its Contents
From the outside, it is easy to assume that TEAs would be concerned

only with executive branch arrangements or that they are purely
administrative in nature. 41 But TEAs matter more than most anticipate.
Surprisingly, many TEAs shape the rights and obligations of individual
actors - foreign and domestic. What links them all is that they govern
trade relationships - the goods and services that enter and exit the United
States - and they do not involve any congressional approval process upon
conclusion and entry into force. The collection assembled here paints a
previously unseen picture of U.S. trade law and our foreign trade law
relationships, very different from what you would believe about U.S. trade
practice if you looked only at FTAs or tariffs as many trade textbooks
do. 42
Looking back in the TEA chronology it becomes evident that their
content evolved cotemporaneously with trade policy and with
congressional delegations seeking to put that policy into effect. In the early
part of the twentieth century, TEAs effectuated reciprocal reductions in
tariffs. 43 In the second half of the twentieth century, they began to take on
a new connotation with the rise of what are known as voluntary restraint
agreements (VRAs) which were protectionist in nature, restraining rather

See, e.g., JOOST H.B. PAUWELYN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (3d ed. 2016).
39 See discussion infra Part III.
40 Besides Guy Capps, few cases in the history of TEAs have sought to define their contours. See
discussion infra Part II.C.
41 Dan Bodansky and Peter Spiro carve out this space as appropriate for "executive
agreements+." Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 28, at 915-16.
42 See generally PAUWELYN ET AL., supra note 38; DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J.
SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (3d ed. 2017).
43 See generally DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, CLASHING OVER COMMERCE 433-43 (2017).
38
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than liberalizing trade flows. 44
Since the 1990s, however, TEAs have been distinctly legislative or
regulatory in that they create rules for private parties, for U.S. government
actors, or for foreign government actors. They largely facilitate growth in
trade and the removal of what are known as non-tariff barriers. Non-tariff
barriers are domestic practices and measures that relate to the
specifications of cross-border goods and services such as labels and
licenses, health-related best practices, intellectual property rights,
environmental protections, labor rights, and much more. 45 The rise of
liberalization as a guiding paradigm in trade policy forced the expansion of
trade law to engage these areas of domestic law, in addition to the
reduction of tariffs. Topics like "food safety" are now interwoven with

modern ideas of trade. 46 More than a dozen U.S. agencies work on trade
issues, each with its own opinion of what the field encompasses. 47
TEAs operate in this expanded trade law space. To differentiate
among trade and non-trade agreements that my team and I collected, we
included only those agreements that govern broadly cross-border
commercial issues as their primary topic area or those that are considered
by trade agencies to be part of their purview. Once these are collected and
reviewed, it becomes clear that TEAs are doing much of the heavy lifting
in trade lawmaking.

In addition to their variable trade-related content, TEAs reveal a
spectrum

of

"bindingness."

A

small

handful

make

no

binding

commitments; some include one or two binding commitments among a
long list of non-binding statements; many include extensive binding rules.
These qualities not only make them difficult to classify and analyze in
traditional ways and terms, but they may suggest a need to revisit those
conventional modes with a nuanced eye. Further, many agreements
establish U.S. influence, capacity building, and dialogue that may help avert
expensive litigation. They are multipurpose instruments in many senses of
the word.
Four principal categories of TEAs emerge in this preliminary review,
distinguished by their legal force and their primary objects: (1) those that
operate like regulations creating binding rules for private actors; (2) those
that impose binding U.S. government commitments with direct impact on
44 See Michael M. Dj avaherian, Volntay Restraint Agreements: Effects and Ingplications of Steel and
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REGUL. 101, 102 (1986).
45 See generaly World Trade Organization, Non-taiff Barriers: Red Tape, Etc.,
https://www.wto.org/enghsh/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm9_e.htm.
46 See, e.g., Simon Lester, The Role of the International Trade Regime in Global Governance, 16 UCLA J.
INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 209, 211, 221-38, 260, 263 (2011) (providing an overview of the expansion
of trade agreements).

Auto Cases, 11

47

See U.S.

GEN.

ACCT.

OFF., GAO/NSIAD-00-76,

MONITOR & ENFORCE TRADE AGREEMENTS 9 (2000).

STRATEGY

NEEDED

TO

BETTER
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private persons; (3) those that create U.S. government commitments to
engage in a future lawmaking process with an indirect impact on private
persons; and, (4) those that form cooperative or non-binding obligations
or that create only binding obligations for a foreign government. I take up
each in turn.
First are those TEAs that create binding obligations for individual
persons and businesses. Take the following examples:
- A memorandum of understanding (MOU) regarding tomatoes
from Mexico that describes how those tomatoes must be treated
prior to export to the United States to be safe for
consumption.48
- An e-commerce agreement with Vietnam setting out service
requirements for cross-border electronic payments. 49
- An exchange of letters with Chile limiting the application of the
U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) standards on grapes
to a specified time of year for a period of five years. 5 0
- An exchange of letters with Canada providing access to pipeline
networks, including promising that a Pacific Northwest power
service provider will offer "treatment no less favorable than the
most favorable treatment afforded to utilities located outside the
Pacific Northwest."5 1
- An agreement to share certain information with China about

medical devices and drug development.52
- An agreement with the European Union (EU) regarding
mutually recognized product labels for energy efficiency.s3
These agreements are akin to typical regulations that agencies generate
domestically. They create enforceable rules for private actors, directly and
indirectly. Some are woven from whole cloth, while others reflect or build
upon existing U.S. legislation or regulation.
Second are TEAs that chiefly create obligations for the U.S.

48 Tomato MOU, supra note 1.
49 Exchange of Letters, U.S.-Viet., Feb. 4, 2016, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/fles/TPPFinal-Text-US-VN-Letter-Exchange-regarding-Electronic-Payment-Services.pdf.
50 Exchange of Letters, Chile-U.S., Nov. 21, 2008, T.I.A.S. 08-1121.
51 Exchange of Letters, Can.-U.S., Nov. 30, 2018, https://www.international.gc.ca/tradecommerce/assets/pdfs/agreements-accords/cusma-aceum/letter-energy.pdf
52 Agreement Between the Department of Health and Human Services of the United States of
America and the State Food and Drug Administration of the People's Republic of China on the
Safety of Drugs and Medical Devices, China-U.S., Dec. 11, 2007, https://www.fda.gov/
international-programs /cooperative-arrangements/fda-sfda-china-agreement-safety-drugs-andmedical-devices.
53 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the European
Community on the Coordination of Energy-Efficiency Labelling Programs for Office Equipment,
Dec. 18, 2006, Hein's No. KAV 8323.

330

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 62:2

government that facilitate import and export or standardization that
increase trade opportunities for U.S. exporters. These commitments are
usually not memorialized in domestic law apart from the agreement itself,
which means their lack of transparency has acute consequences. For one,
the Agreement on Requirements for Beef and Beef Products to be
Exported to Japan from the United States of America does exactly what
the title suggests.5 4 It provides certain rights to the Japanese government,
including access to U.S. meat establishments, and creates a government-togovernment process for disputes that may arise concerning U.S. beef. It
also outlines the steps and obligations for U.S. exporters. Some of that
information is made available through USDA, but not all. 55 Or consider

the MOU between the United States and the Russian Federation
Concerning Certification of
obligations on the U.S. and
seafood exports. The U.S.
obligated to issue veterinary

Seafood Products.5 6 This agreement puts
Russian governments for the facilitation of
Commerce Department, for example, is
certificates for products that originate from

designated vessels and establishments.5 7
Third are agreements that commit the U.S. government to initiating a
process for additional U.S. lawmaking. In this category, a 2020 exchange of
letters with Bolivia promises to "publish a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
in which it will propose to promulgate a regulation ...
that would provide
that Singani [a Bolivian alcoholic beverage] is a type of brandy that is a
distinctive product of Bolivia." 58 These TEAs enter into force directly
upon signature and commit the U.S. government to effectuating a
domestic lawmaking exercise. The U.S. obligation is not to create rights,
but rather to undertake an exploratory review that could result in a change
in law. This is rather unusual in international law but not in U.S. trade law
since FTAs are themselves signed and then "implemented" by Congress.
In the case of FTAs, however, the agreement itself does not even enter
into force until that domestic process is complete, whereas in the case of
these TEAs, starting the domestic process is the entire commitment.
Finally, while most TEAs create binding obligations on the parties, a
54 Requirements for Beef and Beef Products to be Exported to Japan from the United States of
America, Japan-U.S., Jan. 25, 2013,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Requirements%20for%20Beef%20and%20Beef%20Products%2

Oto%20be%20Exported%20to%20Japan%20from%20the....pdf.
55 See, e.g., Decision to Authorize the Importation of Fresh Carrots From the Republic of
Korea Into the United States, 85 Fed. Reg. 34, 591 (June 5, 2020) (describing a work plan with Korea
on fresh carrots but not providing the text).
56 Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States Department of Commerce
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and Rosselkhoznadzor of the Russian Federation
Concerning Certification of Seafood Products from the United States of America to the Russian
Federation, Russ.-U.S., Jan. 27, 2010, T.I.A.S. No. 10-225.
57 Id. at para. 3.
58 Exchange of Letters, Bol.-U.S., Jan. 6, 2020 (on file with author).
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minority of them do not. Thus, a fourth category in this taxonomy
encompasses several dozen non-binding TEAs that generate soft
commitments for dialogue and capacity building or standardization with
trading partners.5 9 Further, several agreements that I place in this fourth
category contain some limited binding commitments, but their purpose is
cooperative. Principally non-binding agreements are among the most
difficult to identify because they rarely are prescribed by statute or
congressional directive. They are not always made public either.
The most prominent among these mainly non-binding agreements are
Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs), which is a name
given to a set of standardized agreements loosely based on a model

developed by USTR. The United States is party to (at least) 54 TIFAs.60
TIFAs are largely cooperative and "provide strategic frameworks and
principles for dialogue on trade and investment issues between the United
States and the other parties to the TIFA."61 While most commitments in
TIFAs are soft, they include some binding institutional commitments and
create a forum for the United States and other governments to meet and
discuss enhancing opportunities for trade and investment. 62
Another standardized TEA found in the data set is what I call a
"relations agreement". The United States entered into 31 of these; the last
relations agreement was signed in 2003. The majority of the relations
agreements were signed with countries in the former Soviet Union from
1978 through the 1990s. 63 They state expressly that they are intended to

59 For more on soft law and its significance in international and foreign relations, see generally
Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in InternationalAgreements, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 581, 583-587 (2005)
(providing a history of soft law and contending that it should be delineated into pledges and
contracts); Jean Galbraith & David T. Zaring, Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
735, 739-40 (2014) (describing soft law and the general rise of "non-legal understandings" in
international cooperation).
60 There is some uncertainty as to the correct total here because USTR, the State Department,
and foreign governments all have different understandings of which TIFAs are in force, despite that
they are well known and active instruments in the trade law orchestra. They are not codified in U.S.
law but they are, for all intents and purposes, fully realized.
61 OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, TRADE & INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK
AGREEMENTS,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/trade-investment-framework-agreements.
It
appears the State Department does not even consider TIFAs to be international agreements at all for
reporting and publishing purposes, except for the fact that it reported about 10 of them as
international agreements between 2002 and 2015, despite that they all have nearly identical content
and only cosmetic differences between them. This inconsistency is endemic in State Department
reporting on TEAs. See Kathleen Claussen, Trade Transparency: A Callfor Surfacing Unseen Deals, 122
COLUM. L. REV. F. 1 (2022) [hereinafter Claussen, Unseen Deals].
62 See e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Concerning the Development of Trade and
Investment Relations, Nig.-US., Feb. 16, 2000, art. 7, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/
uploads/agreements/tifa/assetupload_file172_7727.pdf (establishing a procedure to request a
consultation on trade matters).
63 See, e.g., Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of America and the
Republic of Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyz.-U.S., May 8, 1992, T.I.A.S. No. 92-0821; Agreement On Trade
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establish a framework for "the development and expansion of commercial
ties . .
"64 While their primary purpose was political, they did contain
some binding commitments. Distinct from TIFAs, relations agreements
require the parties to accord "most favored nation" and nondiscriminatory treatment to each other's products. 65 They also improve
market access and strengthen intellectual property protection.66
Across the taxonomy, TEAs manage the cross-border movement of
goods and services, set out the details of our foreign economic
relationships, particularly in the removal of non-tariff barriers, and make
foreign policy. These shared functions occur through their making binding
rules, directing inter-governmental arrangements, and precipitating
lawmaking processes. These are enormous responsibilities. Beyond these
commonalities, TEAs also are distinct from other executive agreements
and from ordinary notice-and-comment rulemaking in their nontraditional

negotiation and conclusion procedures. The next Section addresses those
procedures and uncovers how, despite their absence in express
delegations, TEAs are promoted through structural features in our trade
law.

C. Dealmaking
TEAs are also special procedurally. Certain particularities of trade
lawmaking have structurally favored the rise of TEAs as well as,
surprisingly, their concomitant obscurity. This Section demystifies how
these agreements are made apart from other executive agreements.
Congress has largely promoted the executive's use of TEAs by tightening
or constraining alternative pathways for executive trade lawmaking. A look
at the statutory moves that direct the TEA-making process illuminates
how our institutional design lays the groundwork for TEAs to thrive. This
structural analysis also sheds light on a troubling reality: TEAs are not
readily accessible to the public or to lawmakers. They are not subject to the

Relations Between the United States of America and the Republic of Uzbekistan, U.S.-Uzb., Nov. 5.,
1993, T.J.A.S. No. 12515.
64 Agreement On Trade Relations Between the United States of America and the Republic of
Uzbekistan, supra note 63, at pmbl.
65 See, e.g., id. at 2-12 (providing for (1) most-favored-nation and nondiscriminatory treatment;
(2) commitment to expand mutual trade; (3) transparency of laws and information; (4) protection of
intellectual property; and (5) national treatment in access to courts and administrative bodies and
renouncement of immunity from suit or execution of judgment).
66 The Commerce Department has developed an individualized guide for each of these
"relations agreements." See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF COM., ENF'T AND COMPLIANCE, U.S.-BULGARIA
AGREEMENT
ON TRADE
RELATIONS, https://tcc.export.gov/TradeAgreements/ExportersGuides/List_All_ Guides/exp_002791.asp. Interestingly, Commerce also states that it has a
"designated monitoring officer" for these agreements despite that USTR is responsible for
monitoring compliance. Id.
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same transparency and accountability mechanisms of either FTAs or other
executive agreements. The two go hand in hand: as TEAs were removed
from the "ordinary" international and trade lawmaking regimes, they fell
farther off the congressional, scholarly, and public radars. Thus, after
explaining how TEAs are made, I analyze the organizational gaps that
render them invisible in text even if they remain influential in application.
The institutional framework in which U.S. trade law operates is vast
and deep. 67 Although they have been employed for many decades,
including as early as 1891, TEAs have evolved within that framework as
they have changed hands. 68 In the early part of the twentieth century, the
State Department was primarily responsible for their negotiation and
conclusion.69 The creation in 1962 of the USTR, now the lead agency for
trade lawmaking in the United States, changed that. 70
The institutional shift to USTR precipitated the creation of two
statutory processes for making trade agreements. Both processes, first set
out in the Trade Act of 1974, have served to foster the proliferation of
TEAs, even if inadvertently. 71 First, the 1974 Act created "fast-track." 72
Fast-track included then and now heavy-handed congressional disciplines
and intensive oversight mechanisms for the negotiation of FTAs. 73 A
more cumbersome fast-track and FTA process set the stage for USTR's
avoidance of that process through TEAs.
Second, the 1974 Act formalized an interagency engagement process
for trade policymaking, putting USTR at the top. 74 This change removed
oversight responsibility from the State Department, a position that State
maintains for other executive agreements. USTR acts as the chief
representative of the United States in international trade negotiations of all
67 For a more robust review, see Kathleen Claussen, Trade Administration, 107 VA. L. REV. 845
(2021) [hereinafter Claussen, Trade Administration] (explaining the significance of the administrative
state in trade law).
68 See generaly ALFRED E. ECKES, OPENING AMERICA'S MARKETS: U.S. FOREIGN TRADE
POLICY SINCE 1776 (1995) (describing the evolution of the U.S. trade lawmaking bureaucracy); J.
LAURENCE LAUGHLIN & H. PARKER WILLIS, RECIPROCITY, 209-11, 214-15 (1903) (describing the
early history of trade agreements, including reciprocity agreements in the wake of the McKinley
Tariff Act of 1890). The McKinley Tariff Act of 1890 first authorized the president to negotiate
reciprocal trade agreements with foreign nations. Act of Oct. 1, 1890, ch. 1244, 3, 26 Stat. 567, 612.
69 See IRWIN, supra note 43, at 433-43.
241, 76 Stat. 872, 878 [hereinafter
70 Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794,
Trade Act of 1962]; 19 U.S.C. 2171(c) (USTR shall "have primary responsibility for developing, and
for coordinating the implementation of, United States international trade policy . . .. ").
71 Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19
U.S.C.) [hereinafter Trade Act of 1974].
72 Id. at
101-103, 105, 151-154; FERGUSSON & DAVIS, supra note 32, at 4.
73 See, e.g., Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
1601(a)(1), 102 Stat. 1107, 1260 (1988); Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability
Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-26,
102, 129 Stat. 320 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
4201-4210)
[hereinafter TPA 2015]. Some administrations have been more faithful to its objectives than others.
74 Trade Act of 1974, supranote 71, 141.
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types and is "responsible to the President and the Congress for the
administration of trade agreements programs." 75 Other agencies engaging

in cross-border negotiations under the umbrella of trade law must
coordinate with USTR. 76
USTR realizes its organizing responsibility for trade agreements as
convenor of the Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC).77 This inter-agency
committee, including representatives of more than a dozen agencies,
reviews all trade agreements before their conclusion. USTR plays what
would, in other foreign relations circumstances, be State's "clearinghouse
role." 78 In the ordinary (non-trade) process, 79 the State Department
requires an extensive memorandum internal to the U.S. government and a
careful consideration of factors before providing authorization for an
agency to proceed with an agreement or treaty. 80 The State Department is
responsible for confirming the availability of legal authorities and granting
a green light to agencies before they act for purposes of U.S. foreign-facing
legal consistency. 81 This system helps to manage the enormous range of
executive agreements concluded by the executive branch each year.82

75 19 U.S.C. 2171(c)(1)(F). The "trade agreements program" dates to 1934. IRWIN, supra note
43, at 433-43. However, it has been used primarily to describe reciprocal agreements to lower tariff
rates and, more recently, to FTAs. See generaly ECKES, supra note 68, at 189; U.S. INT'L TRADE
COMM'N, THE YEAR IN TRADE 2018: OPERATION OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM, 70TH
REPORT (providing an example of FTA developments in 2018).

76 19 U.S.C.
77 15 C.F.R .

2171(c)(1)(D).
2002.2; OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXECUTIVE BRANCH

AGENCIES ON THE TRADE POLICY STAFF COMMITTEE AND THE TRADE POLICY REVIEW GROUP,

https://ustr.gov/about-us/executive-branch-agencies-trade-policy-staff-committee-and-trade-pohcyreview-group. To be sure, TPSC has sometimes taken a backseat to other actors in the White House
like the National Economic Council leadership, depending on the administration and personal
relationships. Claussen, Trade Administration, supra note 67, at 888. Likewise, different bureaucrats
have sometimes chosen to coordinate only with some agencies depending on the TEA. Interview
with former USTR official 2, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 18, 2021).
78 Harold H. Koh, Address: Teny-First-CentugInternationalLawmaking, 101 GEO. L. J. ONLINE
1, 9 (2012).
79 See 1 U.S.C. 112b(c) (explaining how most international agreements are subject to approval
by the Secretary of State); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 11 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL 720 (2006),
https://fam.state.gov/fam/1lfam/11fam0720.html (describing aspects of international agreementmaking done with the consent of the Secretary of State).
80 See Hathaway, PresidentialPower, supra note 11, at 249; John R. Crook, Contemporag Practice of
the United States Relating to International Lan, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 636, 657 n.18 (2007) ("Traditionally,
the USTR has taken the position that Circular 175 [the State Department process for clearing
agreements, also known as C-175] is a purely internal State Department matter that does not apply to
the USTR. No parallel procedure exists in the USTR to determine whether an amendment to a U.S.
trade agreement requires congressional approval.").
81 See Hathaway, Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 36, at Part II (examining the process by
which the State Department supervises agencies in forming international agreements).
82 See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF OCEANS AND INT'L ENV'T AND SCI. AFFS., C-175
PROCESS: SUPPLEMENTARY HANDBOOK ON THE C-175 PROCESS: ROUTINE SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY AGREEMENTS ch. 1 (2001), https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/oes/rls/rpts/175/
index.htm (providing an example of how the C-175 process helps the State Department oversee
science and technology agreements); 22 C.F.R. 181.4 (describing how agencies seeking to form an
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In contrast, the TPSC regulations do not set out rigorous guidelines
like the State Department's regulations do for identifying legal authority in
agreements or choosing among instrument labels. 83 USTR makes these
determinations instead. It also takes final decisions on agreement content
and form. 84 For example, say importers of products from Uruguay
approach USTR about concluding a possible agreement with Uruguay on
trade facilitation that would reform Uruguay's customs processes,
committing Uruguay to certain benchmarks and the United States to
providing assistance. This is the type of agreement that is familiar to

USTR: it addresses a grievance brought by U.S. businesses by working
with foreign officials to change their practices in ways that would assist
those businesses. Rather than get approval or guidance from the State
Department, USTR would ordinarily commence negotiations with
Uruguay and share its plans to do so with the TPSC. The TPSC would
concur on the final text prior to signature. 85 This non-controversial
example shows how, in just a few steps, USTR can conclude agreements
with other countries with few checks or balances, often claiming a win for
a U.S. business or industry in the process.
In sum, between the channeling function of an overly constraining
fast-track process, and the creation of a separate trade lawmaking system
giving USTR free reign to develop agreements, the statutory and
institutional foundation was laid for using TEAs to conduct trade policy.86
While this analysis places emphasis on the internal international
lawmaking processes and organization, external influences could likewise
make or break TEAs as an instrument of choice. Just because the trade law
system structurally favors alternative instruments like TEAs does not
necessarily mean such instruments are necessary or useful. But the market
international agreement must comply with Circular 175 and obtain approval from the Secretary of
State or his or her designee).
2003, 2002.2. In exceptional circumstances, USTR staff may preemptively run
83 15 C.F.R.
an agreement plan past the two or three attorneys within the State Department that tend to work
with USTR. Interview with U.S. government official A, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 19, 2019). There
is likewise no formal training or policy manual, such as within the State Department Foreign Affairs
Manual, within USTR for policy staff or attorneys on how to make these choices, but these decisions
are made by senior staff upon consultation with policy and junior staff. Id.
84 The State Department can justify this arrangement as satisfying its statutory and regulatory
oversight rules given that the interagency committee gives it the requisite input per 22 C.F.R.
4
181. (g).
85 Importantly, the TPSC works through consensus, so it is not uncommon for TEAs to be
framed in a way that anticipates the State Department's preferences or objections, but USTR
maintains the last word. Interagency Role, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/about-us/interagency-role.
86 This channeling phenomenon is not limited to TEAs, but rather can be seen throughout our
trade law system. See, e.g., Timothy Meyer, Misaligned Lawmaking, 73 VAND. L. REV. 151, 154-55
(2020) (noting how trade lawmaking has diverged detrimentally because Congress has separated
economic redistribution from liberalization, making it more difficult to engage in legislative bargains
as to the former).
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transformations and growth in global trade of recent decades have
provided a further impetus for the deployment of TEAs to carry out
foreign commerce regulation. Advances in technology and logistics led to
more foreign goods and services in the local market and those goods and

services need to be managed at the border and beyond. 87
Redirecting trade lawmaking away from the State Department and
increasing the requirements for making FTAs created a ripe environment
for TEAs to fill those gaps. The design also favored the development of
TEAs off the grid. USTR and other agencies will sometimes report the
conclusion of a TEA but not share the text, even with those that may be
affected directly or indirectly by its rule-making. 88
Given this state of affairs, developing a comprehensive collection of
TEAs is not just a matter of filing Freedom of Information Act requests.

Rather, my team and I cast a wide net across U.S. government websites,
legislative records, official executive branch records, foreign government
websites, industry websites, academic journal articles, and several personal
contacts to former colleagues both in the U.S. government and in foreign
governments or working abroad. 89 Despite this seemingly exhaustive
search through most of 2019 and 2020, the set reviewed here is necessarily
incomplete. It is not uncommon for me to discover still more TEAs up
through the moment of writing, and that process will continue collectively
as this Article sheds light on what has been identified to date. 90
The vast number of possible sources of TEAs alone highlights the
difficulty in this undertaking, not just for scholars but also for practitioners
87 See, e.g., How One Man and Some Metal Boxes Revolutionized Global Trade, TRADETALKS
PODCAST (June 29, 2020), https://www.tradetalkspodcast.com/podcast/133-how-one-man-andsome-metal-boxes-revolutionized-global-trade/ (describing the role of container shipping).
88 See, e.g., Press Release, Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Statement on Successful
Conclusion of Steel Negotiations with Mexico (Nov. 5, 2020) [hereinafter Mexico Steel 2020],
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2020/november/ustrstatement-successful-conclusion-steel-negotiations-mexico; Press Release, Off. of the U.S. Trade
Representative, United States and Brazil Update Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation
with New Protocol on Trade Rules and Transparency (Oct. 19, 2020), https://ustr.gov/aboutus/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2020/october/united-states-and-brazil-updateUAE Agrees to Section 232
agreement-trade-and-economic-cooperation-new-protocol-trade-rules;
Quota
Deal
on
Alminym
Imports,
INSIDE
U.S.
TRADE
(Jan.
20,
2021),
https://insidetrade.com/trade/uae-agrees-section-232-quota-deal-aluminum-imports.
These
unavailable agreements are not unique in their de facto secrecy. Megan Donaldson has tracked socalled secret treaties in her important work. Megan Donaldson, The Sruival of the Secret Treat: Publiciy,
Secrecy, and Legaliy in the InternationalOrder, 111 AM. J. INT'L L. 575 (2017). See also Danae Azaria, Secret
Treaties in InternationalLa and the Faith of States in DecentralizedEnforcement, 111 AJIL UNBOUND 469
(2018); Ashley S. Deeks, The Substance of Secret Agreements and the Role of Government Lanyers, 111 AJIL
UNBOUND 474 (2018).
89 All told, my team and I located full text copies of 1012 of the 1225 TEAs of which we are
aware. See infra Appendix.
90 A thoughtful colleague offered an apt analogy: Imagine you are looking as hard as you can
across the sky to find new stars for an extended period, and then, one day, you point your telescope
to a part of the sky where you previously thought there was nothing and you discover more galaxies.
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- individuals and businesses - and for other governments. Our search
experience confirms that this study is badly needed beyond merely
academic interest. Foreign trading partners, U.S. and foreign businesses,
workers and consumers, as well as staff within the U.S. government and
members of the scholarly community should find rich and deep wells to
explore in what follows.
II. SCOPING: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT
Apart from the anecdotal examples shared in Part I, how far do TEAs
really stretch and how do they break down by year, trading partner, or
trade sub-topic? This Part parses the preliminary data and then develops a
positive theory for the trends that they evidence before turning to the legal
issues that emerge. In this first look at the numbers, several clear patterns
come to light - and several important outstanding questions.

A. The Data & their Topography
The map in Figure 1 illustrates the wide expanse of trading
relationships with the darker blue indicating more TEAs. As the map
indicates, 130 countries have signed at least one TEA with the United
States. 91
Nearly all these agreements are bilateral: between the United States
and one other trading partner. I have included the handful of trilateral and
plurilateral agreements that are for most purposes treated as bilateral.
Some of those led to bilateral side or spin-off agreements which also make
them important to include.

91 I will use the shorthand "countries," which treats the European Union as one "country" (in
addition to its members) and likewise entities like Taiwan as countries.
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Figure 1
tB

There is considerable variation in the number of agreements with each
trading partner and in their content. The list is top-heavy: forty-six
countries have entered into just one TEA with the United States, and
another 50 have five or fewer. Twenty-two countries are parties to 70
percent of U.S. agreements. In fact, the top five countries alone account
for 31 percent of TEAs. Figure 2 shows the 17 trading partners with 20 or
more TEAs.
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Figure 2
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Figure 3 gives a sense of major trade-related topic areas that appear
throughout the collection. The most prevalent (13 percent) are general
trade agreements not limited to a particular category of goods, service, or
otherwise. These include customs arrangements or general reciprocity
arrangements. For example, one such TEA is a letter exchange between
Bahrain and the United States in 2004 that sets out what parameters apply
to classifying goods for the determination of their tariff rate, known to
trade practitioners as rules of origin)92 Next in frequency of appearance are
food safety TEAs (12 percent); cooperative agreements (11 percent);
textiles (10 percent); agriculture (8 percent), specific goods (6.5 percent),
and investment (6 percent). A variety of topics fall into the "other"
category (nearly 8 percent) including those on environmental protection or
natural resources, labor, and institutional issues such as dispute settlement.

92 Exchange of Letters, Bahr.-U.S., (Sept. 14, 2004), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/fies,
uploads/ agreements/ fta/bahrain/asset_upload_file48_6274.pdf.
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Figure 3
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Categorizing agreements according to a single primary topic area is overly
restrictive, even if generally informative. Thus, for a better sense of the
diversity in the topics covered in the agreements at a glance, the following
word cloud (Figure 4) shows what words appear most frequently in titles

of TEAs.93

93 Some agreements were found without any indication of a title. Where we found a U.S.
government or foreign government agency had titled something in discussing it even if no title
appeared on the face of the document, we used the government-given title. We did not come across
many instances of conflicting titles - i.e., conflicts between government sources and non-government
sources. Where we did, we used the title provided by an official treaty source if available, or I made a
judgment call when necessary. The "opposite" is also true: that is, when we did not have the full text
of a TEA to verify the title, we relied on the title provided by whatever source noted the existence of
the agreement.
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These two depictions and the impenetrable minutiae of the word
cloud in particular reveal that these agreements tend to cover reasonably
precise issues. Take, for example, the U.S.-Malaysia exchange of letters on
distinctive products from 2016. This agreement commits to protecting two
alcohol product names - e.g., Tennessee whisky - for sale in the territory
of the other. 94 Or consider the 2006 Agreement between the United States

and Vietnam concerning Trade in Certain Types of Poultry and Meat
Products which determines under what conditions those products may
enter the territory of either party.95 The range of topics expose the
assortment of specific matters that each highly specialized agreement in
the collection seeks to govern.
Thinking about the map and the topics together, there is considerable
variation in each bilateral TEA profile. Compare Costa Rica and Russia,
for example, as in Figures 5 and 6. Costa Rica has signed 16 TEAs with
the United States covering six common subjects as well as electricity and
mining. Russia has signed 21 U.S. TEAs across six diverse sub-topics.

94 Exchange of Letters, Malay.-U.S., (Feb. 4, 2016), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPPFinal-Text-US-MY-Letter-Exchange-on-Distinctive-Products.pdf.
95 Agreement on Export Duties on Ferrous and Nonferrous Scrap Metal, U.S.-Viet., May 31,
2006, T.J.A.S. No. 06-531.8.
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Like other types of executive agreements, TEAs have been used by the
executive branch for more than one hundred years, but the executive's
reliance on them became far more pronounced in recent years. It was not
until around 1990 that the United States surpassed a cumulative total of
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100 TEAs in force. 96 The earliest agreement still in force is a 1910
commercial arrangement with Portugal.97 From the late 1980s, TEAs
began to pick up in number and in scope as Figure 7 shows. 98 Since 1986,
the United States has never entered into fewer than 12 TEAs in a given
year.

Figure 7
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2004 stands out with 119 agreements. That year, the United States
entered into 25 side letters each with Australia and Morocco - a number
high in general and in concentration. 99 It also concluded side letters with
other FTA partners: Bahrain and nearly each of the countries involved in
the Central America-Dominican Republic-United States FTA (CAFTA-

DR). The next highest year is 2006 with 84, which again is mostly
attributable to a run on side letters to FTAs.100 Removing those two
exceptional years produces an average of 20 TEAs concluded per year

96 See infra Figure 8. Even in the early part of the twentieth century when TEAs were first
authorized, there were several dozen, but not more than 100. See U.S. TARIFF COMM'N,
RECIPROCITY AND COMMERCIAL TREATIES 17 (1919); U.S. TARIFF COMM'N, OPERATION OF THE
TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM: JULY 1934 TO APRIL 1948, pt. 1, at 1-2, 6-7 (1948).
97 Commercial Arrangement Effected by Exchange of Notes Between the United States and
Portugal, Port.-U.S., June 28, 1910, T.S. No. 514 1/2.
98 These numbers are imperfect because some agreements are undated.
99 That was the year that the FTAs with those partners were signed, although the Morocco
FTA did not enter into force until 2006. Australia Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-U.S., May 18, 2004,
Hein's No. KAV 7141; Morocco Free Trade Agreement, Morocco-U.S., June 15, 2004, Hein's No.
KAV 7206.
100 Side letters related to FTAs with Colombia, Oman, and Peru figure prominently that year.
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since 1986.
The data also show that TEAs are cumulative and durable. 101 But the
data are perhaps most unreliable on this measure over any other. 102 A
significant challenge remains in identifying which of these is in force,
which have yet to enter into force, and which may have once been in force
but are no longer so. 103 From the information that we could gather, few
modern TEAs have gone out of force. 104 Only about 11 percent of the
agreements in the collection are known to no longer be in force, or are
negotiated but not yet in force as of January 1, 2020.105 The principal
reasons for termination appear to be replacement by multilateral or
plurilateral agreement or a change in technology that rendered the prior
agreement less useful. Rarely do more than five TEAs drop out of force in
any given year. 106 I also included agreements that have been signed but not
yet entered into force. In several instances, whether an agreement is in
force is nearly impossible to tell from outside (and possibly inside) the
government and, occasionally, may also be a live legal question. Figure 8

101 Cf Julian Nyarko, Giving the Treaty a Purpose: Comparing the Durability of Treaties and Executive
Agreements, 113 AM. J. INT'L L. 54 (2019) (describing treaties as more durable than ex ante
congressional-executive agreements and executive agreements and suggesting that treaty durability
means that presidents may choose treaties over other types of instruments to signal deeper
commitment). But that theory does not explain what is happening with TEAs since, in trade, there is
no treaty option. See supra Part I.B.
102 In at least one instance, the State Department lists an agreement in force, but neither
USTR, the agency that signed the agreement, nor the foreign government believes it to be in force.
See Agreement concerning a United States - Guatemala Council on Trade and Investment, Guat.U.S., Oct. 2, 1991, Hein's No. KAV 3974; E-mail from Official, Ministry of Econ. of Guat., to
Kathleen Claussen, Associate Professor of L., Univ. of Miami Sch. of L. (July 8, 2020 at 4:25PM
EDT) (on file with author).
103 The USTR annual report and the State Department's Treaties in Force (TIF) publication
provided the greatest guidance in this respect, but the TIF is missing many of these agreements so
was not reliable. Moreover, sometimes information from these two sources conflicts. For example,
the TIF stopped listing a 2011 TEA with the Philippines in 2019, as if to indicate it is no longer in
force, but USTR lists it as in force in its 2020 Annual Report. See Protocol to the 1989 Trade and
Investment Framework Agreement Concerning Customs Administration and Trade Facilitation,
Phil.-U.S., Nov. 13, 2011, T.I.A.S. 11-1113. Neither TIF nor USTR lists from where its information
is derived.
104 The exceptions are mostly outdated or replaced food safety and agricultural agreements,
and textiles agreements that were replaced by multilateral systems in the 1990s. Again, however, there
is competing information among the State Department, foreign governments, and USTR - each
having different understandings of which TEAs are in force. The current collection is not
comprehensive in early twentieth century agreements that we know to be out of force.
105 If I did not have definitive information indicating that an agreement was no longer in force,
I have counted it as in force. The absence of information in this respect may also be symbolic of how
international agreements, not just TEAs, fade from prominence and under what circumstances that
may be the case. They may have a half-life that has yet to be studied or comprehensively understood.
I thank Gary Horlick for raising this question with me.
106 My count is based on reviewing the Kavass list of agreements no longer in force related to
trade each year from 2019 to 2000. See, e.g., Subject List of Bilateraland Multilateral Treaties and Agreements
listed in Treaties in Force Januay 1, 2018 But Not Listed in Treaties in Force Janzay 1, 2019, 2019
KAVASS'S GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES TREATIES IN FORCE 671 (2019).
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shows the estimated accumulation of TEAs in force over time.

Figure 8
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grown in reach over this period. In the 1980s and 1990s, the term "minideal" was apt. These agreements dealt with either tariff rate issues or very
narrow product or service details. Consider an agreement with Norway in
1989 on customs. This eight-page agreement addresses exchange of
information and mutual assistance on customs matters.107 Or consider the
even shorter 1993 exchange of notes with Nepal which establishes a limit
on the import of terry cloth towels.108 Narrow and short are common
traits throughout.109 In the last two decades, these single-issue TEAs still
dominate the collection, but particularly during the Trump Administration,
the executive branch has entered into longer and broader TEAs as well.110

107 Agreement between the United States of America and Norway, Nor.-U.S., May 17, 1989,
T.I. A.S. 12118.
108 Memorandum of Understanding, Nepal-U.S., June 20, 1997, https://2001-2009.state.gov/
documents/ organization/ 99252.pdf (referencing Exchange of Notes, Nepal-U.S., Dec. 2, 1993).
109 Of the TEAs for which we have the full text, the average page number is about 14 pages.
The median is six pages and the mode (190 agreements) is two pages each.
110 The "Phase One China Deal" is 91 pages, for example. See 2020 China Deal, supra note 13.
The Obama Administration also used TEAs in pursuit of wide reforms such as in labor. See, e.g.,
Colombian
Action
Plan
Related
to
Labor Rights,
Colom.-U.S.,
Apr.
7,
2011,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/fies/uploads/agreements/morocco/pdfs/Colombian-Action-PlanRelated-to-Labor-Rights.pdf. This is not to suggest that the Trump Administration did not also
conclude truly mini-deals. See, e.g., Shawn Donnan (@sdonnan), TWITTER (Aug. 25, 2020, 9:18 PM),
https://twitter.com/sdonnan/status/1298429567888166914 (asking why the Trump Administration
concluded a skinny deal with the EU on lobsters).
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TEAs also appear in a variety of forms as reflected by their label or
name. International law does not give much credence to names. Whether a
document (or terms agreed orally) constitutes an "agreement" between
two governments in international law depends not on title but, rather, on
content. 111 The same is true in U.S. law on international agreements. 112
Whether states title their agreement as a MOU, an agreement, or a joint
statement is not determinative of any legally significant fact.113
Nonetheless, agreement name can create a signaling effect with respect to
its popularization and implementation, including at the direction of the

U.S. president. 114
The TEAs in this collection take on 29 labels. "Agreement" is the
most prevalent, comprising more than 35 percent of the set. The second
most common label is the letter: side letter, exchange of letters, letter, or
joint letter. Those together make up 27 percent of the collection. Letters
appeared substantially more often in the last 20 years, accounting for a
great deal of the growth in TEAs more generally. For example, since 2003,
USTR has entered into nearly 100 agreements that it has labeled as "side
letters". So-called side letters are agreements between the United States
and another government with which the United States is also negotiating
or has already negotiated a larger agreement, typically an FTA.115 They can

111 In international law, interpretation of the content is what matters; in a minority of cases, the
form may be one factor in such an interpretation. See Anthony Aust, Alternatives to Treaty-Making:
MOUs as PoliticalCommitments, in OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES 46 (Duncan Hollis ed. 2012). See also
MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 815 (2003).
112 See, e.g., 22 C.F.R. 181.2 (defining "international agreement" for purposes of the Case Act
and noting that form is not important but rather is just one of many indicators of intent as to
whether the government intended to be bound).
113 Those in the collection include: "Accord"; "Agreed Minute"; "Agreement";
"Arrangement"; "Compact"; "Conditions"; "Decision"; "Declaration"; "Establishment"; "Exchange
of letters"; "Framework agreement"; "Joint announcement"; "Joint communiqu6"; "Joint
memorandum"; "Joint report"; "Joint statement"; "Letter"; "Measures"; "Memorandum of
understanding"; "Note"; "Partnership"; "Principles"; "Proces-verbal"; "Protocol"; "Record";
"Resolution"; "Settlement"; "Side Letter"; and "Understanding".
114 In view of their nuance, TEA-related controversies about titles do not often fall beyond the
short range of the halls and e-mails of bureaucrats, but, in early 2019, such titles became the subject
of a heated televised debate in the Oval Office. A delegation from China came to Washington, D.C.
for trade negotiations. In the announcement of a forthcoming "deal" between China and the United
States, President Trump and the USTR had an impassioned exchange about what the agreement
would be labelled: memorandum of understanding or something else. They finally settled on "trade
agreement." Ambassador Lighthizer put the issue between him and the president to rest by declaring
"we will never use MOU again." See Trmmp and Trade Adviser Disagree' on What to CallDeal With China,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/video/us/politics/100000006381308/
trump-trade-lighthizer-china.html; Jeff Mason, No more MOUs! USTR LghthiZer Tiveaks Trade
Terminology after Dispute with Trump, REUTERS (Feb. 22, 2019) https://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-trade-china-trump/no-more-mous-ustr-lighthizer-tweaks-trade-terminology-after-dispute-withtrump-idUSKCN1QB2OR
115 Interestingly, side letters and letters more generally are among the stickiest of TEAs. Their
"still in force" curve is steeper than the curve for "agreements." Whether this is because their content
or their form makes them particularly hard to terminate is difficult to assess. They may also be among
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also have the effect of modifying trade agreement language or covering
entirely new topics. Take, for example, a sugar side letter to the
NAFTA.116 That letter changed the NAFTA formula as to how much
sugar Mexican exporters could export to the United States, and effectively

increased the amount U.S. producers could sell. 117 Side letters have been

-

used with every U.S. FTA except the FTA with Canada. There is also
considerable variation in how many side letters are attached to each FTA.
The U.S.-Peru FTA has six side letters, and the U.S.-Singapore FTA has
18. But those numbers are again misleading just as the term "side letter" is.
The United States has many exchanges of letters with other FTA partners
serving the same function - the naming is simply inconsistent. Figure 9
sets out the most popular labels used - those appearing 10 or more times
apart from "agreement" which would dwarf the set. 118

Figure 9
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One could also examine the set with respect to the agencies
responsible for each TEA. As noted above, such an examination would

those most easily lost, although the TEAs the government was unable to locate upon request were
not limited to letters.
116 See U.S., Mexican NAFTA Sugar Side Letters Reveal Two Key Differences, I NSIDE U.S. TRADE
(Mar. 20, 1998), https://insidetrade.com/inside-us-trade/us-mexican-nafta-sugar-side-letters-revealtwo-key-differences.
117 Agriculture: A Glossagy of Terms, Pograms, and Laws, 2005 Edition, CONG. RSCH. SERV., June
16, 2005, at 260.
118 In more than 50 instances, I could not identify a label at all because we do not have the
document and the tie does not reveal its form.
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indicate that USTR negotiates and signs the most TEAs by far. USTR has
concluded roughly two-thirds of the agreements in force after 1974.119
Before 1974, the State Department, the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), and the Commerce Department were among the principal actors
in TEA signing. 120 The FDA and the USDA use MOUs as a means for
assuring food products and agricultural commodities are packaged and
handled properly, among other qualifications. USDA and other agencies
also negotiate "arrangements" for technical assistance purposes. 121 In
many instances, even though we have the full text of the agreement, the
signature is illegible and there is no information about the individual
signing or his or her agency affiliation.

B. Bunnies, Bundles, and Building Blocks
The empirical
assessment above has shown that structural
opportunities and TEAs' exceptional status have provided a platform for
these instruments to proliferate and grow largely unnoticed by lawmakers
and the public - except when they go from mini-deals to major ones. But
why has the United States adopted these types of agreements for these
topics with these countries? Just because the United States has a lot of
agreements with Morocco, for instance, does not mean that the United
States has a close or highly prioritized trade relationship with Morocco.
Quantity does not represent either equal quality or content because TEAs
are not commensurate in what they do. If they were all equal instruments,
numerical comparisons might be more meaningful.
Trying to explain the use of TEAs and, more specifically, their
seemingly indiscriminate deployment is fundamentally a matter of
guesswork. Nevertheless, qualitative research carried out for this project
provides some clues. From the comments of current and former
bureaucrats interviewed for this Article, we can piece together two related
reasons for the proliferation of TEAs: a bunny effect and a bundling trend.
First, some former government staff referred to the need to conclude
multiple TEAs because shortly after concluding one, new questions would
come to light that would necessitate another. 122 The U.S. government

119 This includes agreements that USTR signed and that USTR negotiated even if an
ambassador or other government representative signed the text on behalf of the United States.
120 As noted in the Appendix, the collection is imperfect before 1974 but among the several
dozen that we have collected from this period, these are the agencies that feature prominently. See also
Thomas R. Graham, The Reorganization of Trade Policymaking: Prospects and Problems, 13 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 221, 224-225 (1980).
121 See, e.g., Organic Equivalency Arrangement Exchange of Letters, Taiwan-U.S., entering into
30,
2020,
https://www.ams.usda.gov/services/organic-certification/internationaleffect May
trade/Taiwan.
122 Interview with former USTR official 1, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 1, 2021).
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would conclude a TEA quickly to achieve a political goal, for example, but
then interpretative questions might arise or circumstances - whether
technological or political or otherwise - might change, requiring a further
agreement to tie up those loose ends. 123 In other words, the TEA
negotiation process would lead to multiple offspring - like the
metaphorical rabbit - with the number of TEAs growing exponentially as
earlier TEAs required. A single TEA could lead to several spin-offs. 124
This explanation helps us start to resolve one of the greatest mysteries
of this data set persists: why does the United States conduct trade law in
such small pieces? As these bureaucrats' experiences confirm, in some
instances, the small pieces were the result of a multiplier effect as
negotiations were ongoing with an individual trading partner such as the
engagement with Korea shown in Figure 10, with nearly 100 TEAs since
the 1980s. In certain years, there is a run on agreements - like 2007 and
2018. (The negotiation of the U.S.-Korea FTA occurred in 2007 and the
Trump Administration carried out an "update" in 2018.) Still, that those
events occurred in those years does not explain why the arrangements
were concluded in several separate agreements rather than in a single
agreement, apart from the bunny possibility that one agreement was

concluded and others were realized in short succession.

Figure 10
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they were bundled at that moment in time for political reasons. Separate
agreements were simpler to track and understand when they covered
123 Id.
124 See supra Part II.A.
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different topic areas, especially if there were few to no linkages between
them apart from the trading partner.
Concluding separate agreements is sometimes also necessary for legal
reasons. For example, if delegated authority is framed in very specific
ways, that constraint requires dividing up the bargain rather than
indiscriminately lumping. A similar but still stronger legal reason is that
separate agreements help agencies avoid tipping the balance toward
congressional authority. In other words, small agreements are sometimes
authorized whereas large-scale agreements covering multiple topic areas
require congressional review to enter into force.
Additionally, there are sometimes pragmatic rationales for negotiating
many subject-specific agreements. Negotiating separate agreements
enhances flexibility on the part of negotiators in the future including their
ability to withdraw. But these reasons must be balanced against efficiency
gains in taking up issues together. There is no evidence that such
calculations take place within the executive. Such deliberations, if they do
occur, are well beyond the public eye.
The rationale for using multiple TEAs is less obvious when these
deliberations are not chronologically proximate. Sometimes the speed of
markets and changing conditions at home and abroad require or enable
new agreements to facilitate those changes and so new agreements are
needed from time to time. These sorts of conditions help explain trends
like that seen in the relatively straightforward but separated data of TEAs
with Paraguay as seen in Figure 11. Both this depiction and that of Figure
10 emphasize the modularity of TEAs: they are separate individual units
that can be altered or replaced without affecting the remainder of the
system. They rarely interact with one another even in the course of a single
trade relationship with a trading partner.
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Like other types of agency actions, there are also sociological and
strategic reasons to conclude TEAs in separate pieces where doing so is
consistent with individual leader preferences or where it allows the agency
to grow political capital in a relatively costless way.12s Executive branch
officials may find that having such a document to evidence foreign
cooperation and especially market access may be advantageous to appease
an interest group or even branch leadership, for example. 126
Beyond these theories for TEA proliferation, additional questions
remain: for one, why these trading partners? We could hypothesize that the
number of TEAs might correspond with volume of trade. That theory
holds reasonably well. In recent years, the top five trading partners of the

Japan, and
Germany, with Korea hovering around sixth. 127 Notably, the United States
maintains FTAs with only Mexico, Canada, and Korea in that group. 128 So,
given the numbers in Figure 2, it appears that TEAs are in that sense a
potentially better predictor of trade volume in goods than the presence of
an FTA, but that theory is less valid as one goes beyond the top ten. For
example, the only other TEA partners with more than 20 TEAs that also
figure in the top 15 U.S. trading partners for total trade in goods in 2019
are the EU (considering its members cumulatively), Taiwan, and
United States for goods have included Mexico, Canada, China,

125 Interview with USTR official 6, via Zoom (Nov. 4, 2020).
126 Telephone Interview with former U.S. government official (June 24, 2020) (referring to one
TEA that was concluded only to show government leaders and the public that years of negotiating a
different larger failed agreement were not wasted).
127 See, e.g., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, T
pRADING PARTNERS - December 2019,
https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top1912yr.html.
128 The United States is negotiating a trade agreement, likely an FTA, with the United
Kingdom. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Joint Statement of USTR Robert
Lighthizer and UK Secretary of State for International Trade Elizabeth Truss (May 5, 2020).
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Vietnam.129 Turning to services, where the major partners are the United

Kingdom, Canada, China, Ireland, Japan, Germany, and India, those
countries map less well onto the TEA data. Among that group, as Figure 2
shows, only Japan, Canada, China have high numbers of TEAs. 130
But do the numbers have another symbolic or representative
significance? Why does the United States have 106 TEAs with Japan, or 40
with Colombia, or even more peculiarly, 11 with Indonesia? In some
instances, TEAs appear to substitute for an FTA. Some trading partners
have to rely on TEAs to facilitate their trade because FTAs are untenable
politically. In the case of Japan and the EU, TEAs are doing some of the
work of FTAs even though they do not bring tariffs down to zero. 131 They
are building blocks that may lead to an FTA, or at least foreign trading
partners may see them that way even if that is not the intent of the U.S.
government. But, as noted, Korea, Mexico, and Canada all have a
significant number of TEAs in addition to their FTA. In fact, many of the
top TEA partners are also FTA partners. This correlation indicates not
that TEAs are surrogates necessarily, but rather that FTAs serve as a floor
to a larger relationship on which additional TEAs build. At the least, the
TEA map complicates the traditional story about U.S. trading
relationships. When one considers TEAs in addition to FTAs, the U.S.
geoeconomic picture changes quickly.
III. DESIRABILITY & POTENTIAL REFORMS
TEAs have grown to fill three functional gaps in our trade toolbox and
they do so to some degree with implicit blessing, despite recent
congressional grumbles when they get "too big" or move too far from
what some members perceive to be U.S. national interest. I begin with a

129 EU members make up most of the remaining 15 so the comparison is imperfect. The
trading partners that do not feature on the TEA list but that feature prominently in total trade
numbers (goods) are India and Brazil. The collection shows only 13 TEAs with India and only 11
with Brazil. But more may be imminent. See, e.g., Icso supra note 19; Lawson, supra note 19.
130 Recent Trends in U.S. Services Trade, 2019 Annual Report, Inv. No. 332-345, 10, USITC
Pub. 4975 10 (Sept. 2019) (Final).
131 These hypotheses presume some sort of relationship between the content of the TEAs and
the facilitation of goods and services or in the case of the latter hypothesis, it could be assuming that
TEAs are liberalizing instruments as FTAs are intended to be. Unfortunately, however, there is no
straightforward way to trace a relationship between an agreement and trade flows to know just how
much TEAs are facilitating trade liberalization. One could look more closely at the topics they cover,
but then additional work would be needed to connect those topics to volumes of exports and
imports. The data set assembled here likewise lends itself to further research with respect to the
economic impact of these agreements. Their impact could be considered along multiple dimensions
or measurements such as the volume of trade to which they apply. But there is a great deal of noise
in the data that requires deconstructing. Such an examination is beyond the scope of this project but
would very much enhance our understanding of TEAs' economic contributions, which may in turn
influence our legal analysis as to appropriate governance structures.
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relatively modest defense of the functions TEAs serve. TEAs serve vital
policy roles. These attractions should not be undervalued even if they need

to be better organized and theorized.
I then consider possible reforms to TEA-making and -maintenance
that could improve their oversight and availability. TEAs would benefit
from a re-institutionalization that would reduce legal ambiguity at their
front, middle, and back ends; restrict certain uses of TEAs while
expanding others when circumstances so demand; and, improve public
access to information about them. I identify a set of legal and
organizational design choices that can best address the current
impediments to transparency and availability. To be sure, these alterations
are second-best solutions in the absence of a wider legislative framework
for TEAs, but they account for the negligible present political potential for
more. If not done well, reforming the processes surrounding TEAs could
diminish their utility. To avoid these pitfalls, this Part draws on additional
specific feedback garnered from interviews with government officials to
make a discreet recommendation, in three parts, with respect to the
procedure for concluding and maintaining TEAs.

A. FunctionalDefense
TEAs' reception is mixed. They are neither widely praised nor are they
widely disputed in a general sense. Much of the commentary on TEAs is
specific to an individual TEA and its content. Because they are difficult to
see, despite their importance, most TEAs never make primetime news.
When they have hit the news cycle, some observers have disputed their
legal foundation and, occasionally, their content. 132 Perhaps most often,
observers contest a TEA's legal foundation as a means to contest their
content. They insist that TEAs conform to specific and direct delegations
chiseled out by Congress. That instinct, while well intentioned, is overly
limiting. The delegation issue is important for the rule of law, but the lines
are not as clear cut as many commentators suggest. TEAs accentuate how
that is so.

The same mixed view tends to be shared by members of Congress.
Speaking broadly, TEAs operate in a zone of congressional approval
verging on congressional acquiescence. Still, when members of Congress
challenge USTR's negotiation of a TEA, they typically do not do so with
respect to form. Among the TEAs that have been discussed on the
legislative floor, members have generally accepted them and even
supported their use. 133 One compelling reason for TEAs' general approval

132 See infra text accompanying note 137.
133 See supra note 11. This frequent legislative acceptance of TEAs as an appropriate form for
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and even success to date is their utility.
There are strong arguments for executive branch leadership and
discretion in this space given the scale and complexity of modern
government and global trade. That TEAs may be at least partly accepted
does not mean, however, that our present system for making and
maintaining TEAs is entirely acceptable. Still, moving past those debates
helps us recalibrate our assessment. The law and especially the spectrum of
congressional authorization is expansive enough here to accommodate
TEAs, even if it could be done better. Given this state of affairs, I argue as
a preliminary matter that TEAs merit a place in our law for institutional,
diplomatic, and practical reasons.
TEAs fill at least three specific functions for which other instruments
are less well situated: problem solving; fulfillment of implicit congressional

priorities

on trade; and enforcement

of trade law (domestic

and

international). Although these general functional justifications of the work
TEAs do are not express or easily deciphered from the law, their
invocation is contributing in these many ways to normative
development. 134 Here, I lay out these functions and note also their costs
and exaggerations. While TEAs make meaningful contributions to trade
law and cross-border regulation, not all is rosy.
Problem solving is the commonly offered rationale for "singles and
doubles," as former USTR Robert Lighthizer calls TEAs. When asked in a
2020 congressional hearing about these "skinny deals," 135 Ambassador

Lighthizer replied:
[E]verything we do at USTR is not just an FTA. Right? We worry
about problems that come from American manufacturers and
workers and unions and the like all over the world all the time.
And I have a list here which I won't go through which has got 40
trade lawmaking, at least where they are visible, supports an argument that TEAs are also
presumptively constitutional. But there are perhaps too many unknowns - literal and figurative - to
be fully confident of that position. While Congress accepts the TEAs it knows about, there are many
more about which it may not, making it difficult to rely upon this silence as acquiescence. Congress
sees only a slice of the full array of TEAs - the slice that loud actors want it to see. On the other
hand, congressional non-intervention may be intentional, strengthening support for an idea of TEAs
creating quasi-constitutional custom, to borrow this term from Harold Koh. See HAROLD H. KOH,
THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR

70-71 (1990) (describing "quasi-constitutional custom" as embracing a set of institutional norms
generated by practice of the branches and noting that it is perennially subject to revision). Until these
are tested in their modern form, both branches appear to have reasonably adopted this stance.
134 Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 28, at 890 (observing that "[i]n the foreign affairs context,
practice has historically played a crucial function in setting constitutional norms").
135 Rep. Terri Sewell expressed concern that these "skinny deals" would bypass Congress,
asking for assurance that USTR would not be concluding "skinny deals" like the Japan agreement in
its negotiations with United Kingdom or Kenya. Hearing on the 2020 Trade Policy Agenda Before
the Committee on Ways and Means, No. 116-46, 116k Congress (2020). See Icso, Skinny Deals, supra
note 19.
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or 50 - I call them singles and doubles.... And we work through
these things. . . . Opening the sorghum market in Vietnam[, for
example]. I mean there are just scores of these kinds of things.
And that's one of the things we do at USTR. 13 6
This reference to the many TEAs that USTR has concluded to gain market
access for U.S. products or precipitate other salutary changes in foreign
law is not new. The debate on this issue was perhaps at its height during
discussions about the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) from
2007 to 2009.137 ACTA was a TEA directed at changing intellectual
property (IP) standards in the legal regimes of U.S. trading partners. 138 In a
letter to Congress, then-USTR Ron Kirk stressed that ACTA would
resolve concerns about counterfeiting and piracy by developing in the
domestic law of other countries strong IP enforcement regimes just as
earlier TEAs negotiated by the Clinton Administration had done. 13 9
These exchanges accentuate how the art of the skinny deal, to these
advocates, is to resolve deficiencies arising out of existing trade policy. 140

From their perspective, TEAs address concerns raised by U.S. business
and they happen to do so through agreement.141 The swiftness with which
they can be completed is typically a benefit to U.S. industry in a rapidly
changing market. 142 As Ambassador Lighthizer reiterated: "What we do in
all of these cases is we go and we solve problems for American business
and farmers and ranchers and labor." 143 As per the simplified Uruguay
examples in Part I above, these proponents see TEAs' primary function as
clearing nuanced or technical impediments without demands for deep

136 Id.

Oona A. Hathaway & Amy Kapczynski, Going It Alone: The Anti-Countefeiing Trade
Agreement as a Sole Executive Agreement, AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L. INSIGHTS (Aug. 24, 2011),
137 See, e.g.,

http://www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/insight110824.pdf (noting dispute over whether the ACTA is
fully compatible with existing U.S. domestic law).
138 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), Dec. 3, 2010, 50 I.L.M. 243,
https://ustr.gov/acta.
139 Letter from U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk to U.S. Senator Ron Wyden (Dec. 7, 2011)
(on file with author).
140 As another former USTR official noted, TEAs may also be used to address problems in
prior TEAs, per the "bunny theory" laid out above. Interview with former USTR official 1,
Washington, D.C. (Feb. 1, 2021).
141 See Lighthizer Testimony 2020, supra note 5 (commenting that USTR has "trade discussions
across the board and those have led to a variety of successes . . . clearing up a whole variety of
impediments to U.S. exports and in some cases opening up markets.").
142 That is, they can be legally completed in a single day which makes them far faster than
"fast-track" - a misnomer in that it takes quite some time, even if not as long as most ordinary
legislation. See Caroline Freund & Christine McDaniel, How Long Does It Take to Conclude a Trade
Agreement With the US?, PETERSON
INST. FOR
INT'L ECON.
(July 21,
2016),
https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/how-long-does-it-take-conclude-tradeagreement-us. But see Ganesh Sitaraman, Foreign HardLook Review, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 489, 508 (2014)
("the need for speed and secrecy in foreign affairs, are largely overblown").
143 See Lighthizer Testimony 2020, supra note 5.

356

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 62:2

investigation. USTR and other agencies enter into these arrangements,
applying agency expertise just as would be expected of bureaucrats in any
regulatory space. 144 They do so quickly and practically without any

additional unnecessary scrutiny or impediment.
What this view omits, however, are the trade-offs in such exchanges.
TEAs may serve certain meaningful ends in resolving trade problems for

one industry or business, but they are not without substantive and
procedural costs. For one, Ambassador Lighthizer characterizes TEAs as
entirely one-sided gains for the United States, which is sometimes but not
always true. They are often reciprocal. Take the TEAs that guarantee IP
protection for a foreign label, for example. 145 Many of those agreements
commit the United States to reserving a label for products made only from
a certain foreign region at the exclusion of potential U.S. producers. 146
Agricultural arrangements often feature the same sorts of compromises. 147
Trade agreements inevitably create collateral damage, and it is misleading
to suggest that TEAs are exclusively about opening markets for U.S.
products. There is also a cost in the leverage expended with foreign trading
partners in concluding a TEA. While difficult to measure, using a narrow,
limited tool may achieve certain aims with a foreign government but query
whether there are other foreign policy priorities that are sacrificed by not
building on any possible momentum toward a larger deal. In fact, it was
this silo effect that Ambassador Lighthizer saw as a strength in reaching a
deal with China in 2020. He was able to isolate the issues over which
USTR had authority from other irritants in the relationship with China.148

Commentators saw this as a double-edged sword.149
Likewise, TEAs may achieve victories for well-financed interest groups
that have access to USTR or other agencies, but those may not be as
beneficial on the whole as compared to what might be obtained through

144 See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, A Place for Agency Experise: Reconciling Agency Experise with
Presidential Poncer, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2019, 2021-23 (2015), https://columbialawreview.org/
content/ a-place-for-agency-expertise-reconciling-agency-expertise-with-presidential-power/.
145 See, e.g., Protection of Names of Bourbon Whiskey and Certain French Brandies, Fr.-U.S.,
Dec. 2, 1970, Jan. 18, 1971, 10 J.L.M. 673.
146 Id.
147 See, e.g., Letter from Krysta Flarden & Darci Vetter to Johann N. Schneider-Ammann on
the U.S.-Switzerland Organic Equivalency Arrangement (July 9, 2015), https://www.ams.usda.gov/
sites/default/ files/media/Letter%20to%20swiss%20FOAG.pdf.
148 See, e.g., Bob Davis, Trade Chief LEghthiZer Urges Biden to Keep Tariffs on China, WALL ST. J. (Jan.
11, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trade-chief-lightlizer-urges-biden-to-keep-tariffs-on-china11610361001 (referring to when U.S. Trade Representative Lighthizer commented that he sticks to
his "lane").
149 See, e.g., Wendy Cutler (@wendyscutler), TWITTER (Aug. 21, 2020, 1:34 PM),
https://twitter.com/wendyscutler/status/1296863176466796549 ("Looks like US mini #tariff deals
are all about catching up with lost market access due to our trade wars and sitting on the sidelines as
others do preferential deals. There's so much more we could and should be doing with the EU on
trade beyond lobsters.").
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another process including public input. 150 With the limited information
now available, it is difficult to compare readily the present TEA-making
process to alternatives. But the fact that information is limited contributes
to the problem. TEAs represent a workaround to regular rulemaking that
helps bureaucrats avoid the processes associated with that system, therein
shielding interest groups or other advocates from exposure. A related
vulnerability of TEAs is their fragility, though this likewise cuts both ways.

FTAs implemented by Congress are seen by many as more dependable
than an executive agreement without the same lock-in effect. 15 1 As
President Biden recently did with a deal with the United Arab Emirates,
executives can exit TEAs as easily as they can get into them, creating
questions of predictability for trading partners. 15 2
A second potentially salutary function of TEAs is that they can realize
congressional will - spoken and unspoken. In both the 2019-2020
congressional debates and in the context of the ACTA, officials justified
TEAs as carrying out that which Congress intends even if not explicit.
According to Ambassador Lighthizer: "The purpose of a [trade agreement]
is to make sure that the United States Congress has enough room - policy
space - within whatever we negotiate to accommodate whatever the
Congress comes up with. . . . what I wanted to do in a trade agreement is
just make sure there is space so that you could do - I mean, you,
collectively - what the United States Congress decides U.S. policy should
be." 15 3 This attraction turns on a particular vision of the separation or
rather the cooperation of trade law powers: one that sees authority on a
spectrum of approval, even if indirect. 15 4 Referring to ACTA, then-Legal
Adviser of the State Department Harold Koh likewise pointed to statutory
authority in the form of a congressional call to action to engage with
international partners. 155 He suggested that congressional approval can be
implicit including where the executive finds it "consistent with existing

law."

156

This general rationale for TEAs accounts for the fact that Congress

sweeps in broad strokes and cannot be expected to anticipate every cross150 One practitioner pointed to the U.S.-Canada Softwood Lumber TEAs as representative of
a broader trend according to which "special interests make deals". Interview with former USTR
official 2, Washington D.C. (Feb. 20, 2021).
151 See Claussen, supranote 29, at 318, 320 (describing the reliability that fast track created).
152 See Jennifer Doherty, Biden Reverses Trump's Softening of UAE Aluminum Tariff, LAW360 (Feb.
2,
2021),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1351146/biden-reverses-trump-s-softening-of-uaealuminum-tariffs.
153 Lighthizer Testimony 2020, supra note 5.
154 Koh, supra note 78, at 7-8.
155 Letter from Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, to Senator Ron Wyden (Mar.
6,
2012),
http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/84365507-State-DepartmentResponse-to-Wyden-on-ACTA.pdf.
156 Koh, supra note 78, at 8.
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border issue that may arise. Moreover, in the face of interbranch deadlock,
TEAs are well positioned. The question, however, that remains for lawyers
is just how specific that delegation needs to be to avoid undermining
congressional authority and creating uncertainty in not just our
international commitments but also in related domestic regulation. 15 7
Those are significant issues that weigh strongly against the functional
benefits TEAs may provide.
Further, to be sure, by stepping away from the congressional-executive
legal regime for trade agreements, TEAs can more easily avoid abiding by
the carefully enumerated congressional direction. The executive is now
incentivized to work outside the shared congressional-executive system in
light of its increased constraints. 15 8 The growth in reliance on TEAs could
signal that fast-track priorities and that legal regime more generally have
grown too large for management or for practical foreign commercial
lawmaking.
A third constructive function TEAs serve is enforcing both domestic
and international law. For instance, the 2020 China "Phase One Deal" is

intended as a step toward settling issues the United States raised with
China under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.159 Section 301 permits
the president to act when the USTR determines that an act, policy, or
practice of a foreign country is unreasonable or discriminatory and
burdens or restricts U.S. commerce. 160 In its Section 301 investigation
report issued in March 2018, USTR concluded that China is engaged in
acts, policies, or practices related to technology transfer, intellectual
property, and innovation that are unreasonable or discriminatory and that
burden or restrict U.S. commerce. 161 Section 301 authorizes the USTR to
"obtain the elimination of that act, policy or practice" through any action
within the power of the president. 162 In this instance, USTR negotiated a
"deal" with China as part of its enforcement. 163

&

157 See Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 28, at 46 (arguing for the use of "executive agreements+"
in face of inter-branch deadlock).
158 That the executive would shift to tools where congressional oversight is decreased can be
seen also in the recent shift to use tariffs instead of trade agreements. See, e.g., Kathleen Claussen,
Trade's Securny Exceptionalism, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1097, 1102 (2020).
159 See Trade Act of 1974, supra note 71, 301.
160 Id.
161 Actions by the United States Related to the Section 301 Investigation of China's Laws,
Policies, Practices, or Actions Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation,
83 Fed. Reg. 13,099 (Mar. 22, 2018).
162 19 U.S.C. 2411(b)(2).
163 2020 China Deal, supra note 13. When USTR Lighthizer testified before the House Ways
Means Committee in February 2019, he told members of Congress that USTR would not be sharing
the draft deal with Congress because it was an executive agreement negotiated without obligation of
congressional approval further to statutory authority. Testimony of U.S. Trade Representative Robert
LJghthiZer, House Ways & Means Comm., YOUTUBE (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/

watch?v=plJBuKzC_Hg.
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But the China "Phase One Deal" also reflects some of the difficulty
with relying on general enforcement rationales for TEAs, even when
backed by delegations of authority. For one, they suffer from few
instructions on the limits of that authority. The China deal goes much
farther than just the intellectual property practices that the Section 301
investigation reviewed. USTR also describes monitoring trade agreements
for compliance by U.S. trading partners as one of its core functions, 164
except that the transparency problems identified earlier diminish the
strength of that position. The fact that USTR staff could not locate many
TEAs suggests that compliance may not be a top priority. That this is so
would be less consequential if these were soft law agreements with few or
no binding commitments, but that is not the case. Finally, a corresponding
enforcement consideration in U.S. and international law may be just how
much weight the United States places on TEAs as binding arrangements
for itself or U.S. actors. 165 Given TEAs' complicated status in U.S. law,
international partners would face difficulty ensuring that the United States is
acting in compliance with any commitments it has made.
Apart from these three major functions, TEAs can serve still other
practical functions such as by signaling diplomatic priorities in addition to
trade priorities. And they may also suffer from additional practical flaws
and costs such as by creating fatigue among trading partners or with

members of Congress.
What becomes apparent from these attractive functions and their costs
and overstatements is that TEAs are at least somewhat useful some of the
time. Under certain conditions, the institutional, diplomatic, and practical
advantages may outweigh valid concerns about public participation and
unscrupulously defined delegations, among others. The challenge is in
agreeing when that may be so.

B.

An OrganiZationalProposal

A risk of drawing attention to the hidden world of TEAs, their recent
expansion, and their problems is that opponents will overemphasize their
164 See, e.g., OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, ENFORCEMENT, https://ustr.gov/
issue-areas/enforcement.
165 This point assumes that trading partners will start to rely on TEAs more heavily than in the
past - and that is precisely what I would expect given the Trump Administration's expansive use and
the anticipated use by the Biden Administration. See, e.g., Maria Curi, Canada'sAmbassador: Aluminum
Exports Aren't Hurting the U.S. Market', INSIDE U.S. TRADE, June 23, 2020 (describing the
disingenuous use of a TEA reached between the U.S. and Canada that the Trump Administration
was then prepared to disregard). Indiscriminate uses of agreements risk harm to the institutional
integrity of executive agreements more generally as well as U.S. credibility among our trading
partners. See, e.g., David Henig (@DavidHenigUK), TWITTER (June 23, 2020, 10:59 AM),
https://twitter.com/DavidHenigUK/status/1275443263751589888
("Signing trade agreements
counts for little for this US administration.").
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flaws. They could become pawns in a separation-of-powers tug-of-war or
the target of interest groups seeking external control over agencies.
Tightening congressional influence on TEAs through more intensive
controls on their underlying delegations could also incentivize the
executive to achieve the same even farther beyond the public eye. TEAs
ought not to be overlooked, but they also ought not to be covert.
Transparency and recordkeeping challenges are subsidiary problems in this
study and in the operation of TEAs, including with respect to TEAs or
parts of TEAs not covered here that may be classified.

In short, TEAs are "under the radar," but should not become "under
the table." 166 TEAs ought to be accessible and available, but it would limit
their utility substantially if they were to be in all instances bogged down in
the full panoply of administrative or congressional review. The better
choice is to reconsider how to institutionalize TEAs in a way that
endeavors to rectify their problems and exploit their benefits over
alternatives.
At present, we lack a legal process that accommodates appropriately
TEAs for all that they do. Such a legal process - as in the form of
framework legislation that would replace or be part of fast-track - could
establish rules of engagement that incorporate the TEA customs that have
evolved and which Congress advanced implicitly with the structure it built.
TEAs are here to stay. Pivoting then to some ways to parse that delicate
conversation, one key may be in determining in what ways TEAs ought to
maintain their current functions, expand or contract them, and in what
forms. Lawmakers may wish to seek to identify a continuum of
appropriate TEA use. For example, a re-evaluation of the system could
select the ways TEAs work best or are uniquely positioned and the ways
they interfere with congressional prerogatives the most, making certain
adjustments to the decision-making levers available to the executive. Our
collective work going forward ought to be teasing out this continuum for
different categories of TEAs and their respective organization.
What I outline may be a first-best institutionalization option, but the
likelihood of such an undertaking being realized anytime soon is somewhat
low. The mixed incentives of all the players at work in this space make
such a creative renaissance for trade law and policymaking implausible.
Moreover, as noted from the outset, this project illustrates that we know
too little about this uncharted legal domain. To make more than
uncomplicated recommendations at this stage would be premature. But the
time for at least considering the menu of possibilities begins now. It makes
sense to activate TEAs while correcting where possible these operational

166 Cf Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 28, at 891 (commenting that suppressing executive
agreements+ in the courts or otherwise will likely drive this agreement-making underground).
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mechanics. An organizational revision ought to be a politically feasible step
forward and a reasonable second-best option to a general enabling statute.
First in this revision could be differentiation. The dominant
(mis)perception is that current law provides for the conclusion and
implementation of only one type of trade agreement - the FTA - through
fast-track legislation. But, as noted above, that same statute also provides
for limited TEAs. With some additional differentiation in the statutory and
administrative requirements for making trade agreements, such as through
a sort of "fast-track-lite" arrangement, Congress could create a reporting
system for certain TEAs. Revised fast-track provisions with intermediate
steps precedent for certain types of TEAs according to which USTR
works directly with its congressional oversight committees would facilitate
better engagement. Such an arrangement could provide safeguards to
avoid executive overreach that opponents of TEAs fear. It would create
congressional off-ramps to stop TEAs that risk going beyond executive
mandates. 167 The details would be important to prevent Congress from
taking an overly interventionist approach. But it would provide some
oversight where presently there is none. Moreover, a modified fast-track
could better distinguish between alternative types of reporting for different
types of TEAs. Congress could work within the existing legislation to
which it is accustomed and make these changes at the margins.
A second aspect of this revision, ironically, is standardization. To assist
in managing the differentiated legal approval process I have just proposed,
the system could be simplified with some basic organization among labels
for trade agreements. As Part II displayed, the mix-and-match style of
labeling allows executive branch agencies to game the naming process and
avoid accountability. Some easily distinguishable lines on labels and their
uses would help in this restructuring.
Third, to improve public agreement awareness, Congress ought to
consider revising the statutory guidelines for publishing executive
agreements and expressly treat TEAs apart, but in a way that requires their
publication, rather than leave USTR to develop its own practices. 168 In
other words, it should rework the structure that favors TEAs'
exceptionalism and create a normal process to make their existence
known. At present, the Case Act leaves it to the State Department to
167 See generaly Julian Ku, Treaties as Law: A Defense of the Last-in-Time Rule for Treaties and Federal
Statutes, 80 IND. L.J. 319 (2005). Of course, Congress could legislate over TEAs if it wanted, and it
has, but not for some time. See Trade Agreements Extension Act of June 15, 1951 Act, 5. On more
recent occasions, it appeared to act to rein in letter practice, but if that was its intent, it has
undoubtedly looked the other way since doing so. See 19 U.S.C. 3805.
168 Others have gone still farther suggesting an APA for executive agreements. See Hathaway,
Presidential Power, supra note 11, at 242-53. I fear, however, that the full constellation of APA rights
and duties may prove counterproductive for TEAs, as discussed above, although more might be
done to reconcile the C-175 and TPSC processes.
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decide what is made public, and State relies on other agencies to provide
that information to it.169 Trade's constitutional status warrants a tradespecific Case Act provision that cuts out the State Department as a

middle-person.
Organizational adjustments alone will not resolve the legal questions
that TEAs raise, nor will they fully institutionalize TEAs in the zones in
which they operate whether inside or outside the executive branch, or
inside or outside the U.S. government. But these recommendations could
ensure that the law takes better account of the work TEAs are playing, and
then lawmakers may consider those consequences in greater depth.
IV. IMPLICATIONS: REVISITING PARADIGMS

-

The previous Parts showed the extent of TEAs' control - as trade
tools, as instruments of foreign policy, as products of constitutional lawdriven choices, and, perhaps most importantly, as domestic law-making
devices. They have emerged wielding considerable power in the
governance of individuals, businesses, and the work of the government
protecting health and safety, promoting innovation, supporting economic
growth, and policing detrimental practices, just to name a few of their
crucial roles. There are institutional, procedural, legal, and epistemic
lessons to be gleaned, and then there is a long list of descriptive and
analytical work yet to be done. This Part analyzes the early takeaways and
articulates a list for future scholarship.

A. The Many Sites o Foreign Commerce
Among the most significant outcomes of this project is that
recognizing the work of TEAs both clarifies and complicates our
understanding of trade. First, it calls into question prior accounts of trade
law that focus on the big congressional-executive agreements. 170 The field

of trade law today is broad in subject, but most of the study of trade law
has focused narrowly in form on the WTO and on FTAs. Leading
accounts of trade law over the years have provided rich insights into the
content and constitutionality of FTAs as well as into the workings and
dispute settlement features of the WTQ. 171 That work began at the time
169 We might also consider the Case Act's antiquated design. I elaborate on this in a recently
published piece. See Claussen, Unseen Deals, supra note 61.
170 See, e.g., Chad Bown, Robert Staiger & Alan Sykes, Multilateralor BilateralTrade Deals? Lessons
from History, in ECONOMICS AND POLICY IN THE AGE OF TRUMP 153, 158 (Chad Bown ed., 2017);
DEVIKA DUTT & KEVIN GALLAGHER, Trade LiberaliZaton and Fiscal Stability in Developing Countries
(June 2020), http://www.bu.edu/gdp/files/2020/07/GDP_Fiscal-Stability-Report_Final.pdf.
171 See, e.g., Ackerman & Golove, supra note 31 (covering the constitutional questions regarding
FTAs); John H. Jackson, The Case of the World Trade Organization, 84 INT'L AFFS. 437 (2008).
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those FTAs became regular trade policy fixtures in the early 1990s and
2000s, but the debates and discussions continue, including most recently
with the USMCA, and the U.S. calls for WTO reform. 172 However, this
spotlight, while reflective of widely reported international trade policy
decisions, gives a false sense of precisely all the legal instruments at play in
the field. The trade literature has left the story of TEAs largely untold.
Thus, this study gives us not just a more complete picture, but quite a
different one as to who writes the rules and what those rules look like.
And yet, if the absence of TEAs from trade law were simply an academic
matter, this study might be less consequential. But the matter is hardly
academic. Rather, TEAs are often left out of the congressional field of view,
in an area in which Congress has the constitutional prerogative. 173 The
result is that Congress' policymaking choices turn on not just incomplete
but also incorrect information.
The economic stakes that we know so far are already high. Consider
the recent China deal. 174 It implicated U.S. tariffs of 25 percent on $250
billion worth of Chinese goods. 175 China also committed to buying $200
billion worth of U.S. products and services over two years. 176 Research
presented to Congress as representative of our trade law omitting these
types of arrangements has sorely underestimated the work of the
executive. 177 And that is just among what is obviously part of trade.
Moreover, we know now that, because of trade's disciplinary growth, and
expansive interpretations of delegated authority, TEAs extend the reach of
"foreign commerce"-premised regulation far beyond the work of USTR.
There are today so many delegations to the executive to engage in traderelated activities that it takes a two-volume compilation for Congress to
keep track and even that is incomplete. 178 Since it is a herculean, if not
impossible, task to link up every agreement that is related to trade with a

172 See Mark Linscott, The Trmp Adminitration's Plan to Upend the

WTO,

NEW ATLANTICIST

(June 18, 2020), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-trump-administrationsplan-to-upend-the-wto/.
173 U.S. CONST. art. I, 8, cls. 1, 3. This is despite the fact that occasionally Congress has tried
to control for extralegal lawmaking by the executive. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. 4805; James Gathii, Defining

the Relationship between Human Rzghts and Corruption, 26 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 31, 42 (discussing the
congressional efforts to limit TEAs while recognizing it was impossible to fully tie the hands of the
executive).
174 2020 China Deal, supra note 13.
175 David Lawder, Andrea Shalal & Jeff Mason, What's in the U.S.-China Phase 1 Trade Deal,
REUTERS
(Jan.
15,
2020),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-detailsfactbox/whats-in-the-u-s-china-phase-1-trade-deal-idUSKBN1ZE2IF.

176 Id.
177 See, e.g., CONG. RSCH. SERv., Treaties and Other InternationalAgreements: The Role of the United
States Senate (2001), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-106SPRT66922/pdf/CPRT106SPRT66922.pdf (noting linkages between investment and trade agreements, and tax and trade
agreements) [hereinafter Senate Report 2001].
178 See STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, supranote 35.
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particularized applicable delegation from Congress, 179 the question is more

often avoided than addressed.
Drawing together this body of law corrects our idea of how trade law is
made. U.S. trade law is developed through international agreements,
statutes, regulations, presidential proclamations, judicial decisions, and
arbitrations, among others. No one type exists in isolation, however; the
law generated from these sources regularly interacts - sometimes in
unexpected ways that create more questions than they resolve. Agencies

like USTR may select from among an FTA, TEA, tariff, diplomacy,
international institution, or sanction, among others, to carry out executive
branch priorities. Not all are created equal.180 In some instances executive
authorities may serve better than congressional-executive agreements.
Each tool has its own set of constraints and requires different types of
transparency and consultation with Congress.
Acknowledging these distinctions allows us to deconstruct the
president's choices in the ongoing trade war and contextualize them in this
highly textured bi-branch environment. With the unfettered ability to
select from this menu of lawmaking devices, executive officials determine
not just the method to achieve U.S. transnational commercial policy aims,
but also the policies themselves. This revised account calls for more study
of those critical interactions and the effects of relying on any one type in
each circumstance or to achieve the functions that trade policymakers
claim they are pursuing. Ultimately, trade policymakers need to think about
TEAs, tariff authorities, FTAs, and other rules together. 181 By largely
ignoring TEAs, these policymakers may have missed the forest for the
trees.
The interagency process also bears lessons for foreign relations and
administrative law practitioners and scholars alike. USTR has an outsized
influence in the TPSC process, akin to the role of the Office of
Management and Budget in interagency regulatory review. 182 It can
redirect other agency action in the shaping of TEAs. Sparse public
discussion of the deliberative process in that setting means we know little
about what actually goes on at that ground level of TEA-making. Apart
from rendering it difficult to evaluate alone, these constraints also make it

179 But see Hathaway, Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 36, at Part III (undertaking to look at
the trade agreement delegations reported by the State Department to Congress).
180 See Jean Galbraith, From Treaties to InternationalCommitments: The Changing Landscape of Foreign
Relations Law, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1675, 1697 (2017) [hereinafter Galbraith, Changing Landscape]
(describing how a structural shift toward multiple pathways for making international commitments
has altered traditional separation of powers ideas).
181 And more. See e.g., Meyer, supranote 86, at 154-55 (analyzing other trade policies that have
become siloed).
182 See, e.g., Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirial Investigation, 70
U. CHI. L. REv. 821, 830 (2003).
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difficult to assess in comparison with ordinary rulemaking, for example, or
to appreciate fully the value of agency expertise that such a process may
yield. But at least one initial takeaway is that there is an expansive
community - call it the "foreign commerce bureaucracy" - through which
TEA and other foreign commerce law decisions are filtered. Its work is
not static, but rather highly productive and dynamic in pushing out TEAs
each year.
There are likewise institutional lessons to be reviewed from the
tapestry woven here about what happens after trade agreements are made.
A first is that the existing literature tends to overemphasize the start and
end of the international agreement process. With those emphases, it is not
surprising that the primary areas of commentary relate to legal authority to
enter agreements and legal authority to exit.183 But there is much more to
the life of TEAs after they enter into force. Apart from their duration, they
have active and passive features. A number of TEAs create councils for
engagement that may engender a sense of community and carry out their
own additional lawmaking. 184 TEAs accumulate over time. 185 Their
implementation may not occur in a solitary moment, but may bootstrap
other TEAs and other domestic rules. 186 Thus, this study helps us adjust
the compass from just inputs and outputs in trade or foreign relations to
also consideration of what I will name "midputs": the points in the
existence and application of the international agreement that are
meaningful in law or policy.
The system for achieving compliance with international rules on which
Congress and civil society tends to place strong emphasis 187 may not be
manageable in light of this extensive landscape of agreements, even apart
from the recordkeeping challenges. Agreement maintenance, monitoring
and enforcement opportunities feature more prominently here. We have
seen that the constellation of U.S. obligations has become so complex, the
government has lost track of them. Resolving this organizational problem
is not a matter of increasing the size of the foreign commerce bureaucracy
where continued growth to date has become a self-fulfilling prophecy as it

&

183 See, e.g., Joel P. Trachtman, Power to Terminate U.S. Trade Agreements: The PresidentialDormant
Commerce Clause Verses an Historical Gloss Ha/f Empy, 51 INT'L L. 445, 445 (2017); Bradley
Goldsmith, supranote 11, at 1206-20, 1223-26.
184 See, e.g., Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Republic of Ecuador relating to Trade Rules and Transparency, Ecuador-U.S.,
July 23, 1990, Hein's No. KAV 3963.
185 See, e.g., Figure 9, supra.
186 See, e.g., Claussen, Multple Pathways, supra note 10, at 274-78 (describing how the entry into
force of certain TEAs required the Treasury Department to engage in supplementary lawmaking).
187 See, e.g., W&M Democrats Urge USTR to Strengthen USMCA's Environmental Language, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Apr. 17, 2019, at 2 (noting that enforcement was the primary political issue in the
USMCA negotiations).
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continues to box other actors out. 188 To approach this systemic problem
with such a band-aid is the retail-level takeaway from a bird's eye view of
this collection. Instead, the wholesale version for addressing this challenge
involves identifying TEAs as tools in the trade arsenal, and thoughtfully
evaluating priorities and systemic design choices.

B.

Interdiszplinay Reorientations

Taken as a whole, a now-perhaps-obvious conclusion is that TEAs
demand interdisciplinary treatment to be fully understood. The process
through which they are designed, negotiated, implemented, and maintained
is a hybrid exercise that draws on and offers takeaways for multiple areas
of law. They are both subjects of and products of diverse and overlapping
bodies and carry lessons for how we think about those bodies'
intersections. In particular, seeing TEAs at the legal core of the crossborder administrative state's activities ought to prompt scholars and
practitioners to reevaluate existing paradigms and the norms shared or
contested across these fields.
One reorientation prompted by this study concerns thinking about
executive agreements generally not through authority-driven categories but
rather through a functional taxonomy of what these agreements achieve,
or seek to achieve in U.S. and international law. Driven by typologies of
international agreements oriented around the separation of powers, and
seeing FTAs as occupying the trade space, most foreign relations law
studies have only briefly touched upon TEAs. 189 Now visible, TEAs
unsettle the constitutionally driven categorization of international accords
in U.S. law. 190 The dependence on carefully delineated categories of sole
executive agreements, congressional-executive agreements (especially ex

post agreements), and treaties elides the under-the-radar instruments that
fall elsewhere on the spectrum. In this cross-cutting terrain, TEAs push
our thinking beyond the traditional molds and categories. Indeed,

188 See also Fred O. Boadu & Jie Shen, An Empirical Anaysis of the Growth and Autonom of the
Office of the United States Trade Representative, 6 CURRENTS: INT'LTRADE L.J. 3, 9 (1997).
189 See Senate Report 2001, supra note 177, at text accompanying note 73 (acknowledging that it
is omitting TEAs from its review). See also Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Ageements, and Constitytional
Method, 79 TEX. L. REv. 961, 964-1009 (2001); Michael D. Ramsey, Execytive Agreements and the
(Non)Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. REV. 133, 160-83, 218-35 (1998). Even studies that have looked a bit
beyond traditional categories still paint typologies on the basis of constitutional authority. See, e.g.,
Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 28, at 887-88 (suggesting a new typology based on a range of legislative
authorizations).
190 Some commentators have recently pushed back on this taxonomy. See Harold H. Koh,
Trptych's End: A Better Framework To Evalate 2 1st Centuy International Lamaking, 126 YALE L.J. F.
338, 339-45 (2017); Galbraith, Changing Landscape, supra note 180, at 1678-79; David A. Wirth,
Executive Agreements Refying on Implied Stattoy Authory: A Response to Bodansky and Spiro, 50 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 741, 751 (2017).
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preexisting normative ideals of cooperation among the branches and
treatments of executive branch international lawmaking as monolithic are
part of the reason we tend to miss TEAs hiding in plain sight in the first
place.
Further, existing studies do little to uncover precisely what these
agreements achieve in practice. Congressional and scholarly attention to
one set of constitutional bargains may have in fact pushed executive
branch agencies to proceed through other means. One implication of this
project then may be to socialize the many players in the TEA story to the
significance and contributions of TEAs, rather than their limitations.
A related interdisciplinary reorientation is toward identifying codified
state commitments to supplement scholarship on transnational regulatory
networks. The literature concerning how domestic actors cooperate in
international settings has peered below the surface to examine the
extensive work of bureaucrats harmonizing and creating best practices. 191
However, those studies do not often extend beyond the frequent informal,
soft law arrangements of civil servants to consider the formal, hard law
created by TEAs to which their work contributes or that may be
orthogonal. Refraining our attention toward TEAs then opens parallel
research streams.
A third reorientation is a corollary of the first two: rather than see
TEAs as only foreign policy instruments, we ought to view them properly
as domestic rules. Such a new paradigm would consider this manifestation
of trade lawmaking as not just the province of constitutional and foreign
relations law, but also belonging and contributing to administrative law.192
Isolating TEAs as this study has done concentrates our attention on how
they serve as an alternative medium through which some agencies operate.
It is not just that they could create binding rules or that they are doing so
outside our rulemaking system. 193 through ordinary notice-and-comment
means. Agencies exploit TEAs to govern cross-border economic activity
when that work would otherwise occur through notice-and-comment or
through statute, across a host of subject areas. Moreover, TEAs have
significant force: they can stop the movement of goods and services with a
foreign country with a simple termination or modification to the

191 See, e.g., Elizabeth Trujillo, Regulatog Cooperation in International Trade and Its Transformative
Effects on Exective Po er, 25 IND. J. GLOB. L. STUD. 365 (2018); David Zaring, Informal Procedre, Hard
and Soft, in International Administration, 5 CH. J. INT'L L. 547 (2005); Pierre-Hugues Verdier,
TransnationalReglatoy Net orks and Their Limits, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 113 (2009).
192 Jean Galbraith has convincingly argued that administrative law influences the way
international commitments are implemented. See Galbraith, Changing Landscpe, supra note 180, at
1679. My argument seeks to move this one step farther through the window of TEAs.
193 See generaly Hathaway, Treaties'End, supranote 11, at 239 (arguing for bringing international
agreements into administrative law).
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agreement, and those affected would have little legal recourse. 194 Thus,
with the information collected here, we can analyze for the first time how
big a role TEAs play in the vast trade administrative state.
Since TEAs are executive branch instruments, we might expect them
to trigger certain requirements under administrative law - either
transsubstantive statutes like the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)195
or subject-specific statutes and processes that direct agency action and
accountability. There also, however, the search for guidance as to the
workings of TEAs yields few clues. Most administrative law scholarship
does not take up foreign agreements as a means of making binding rules,
even if they have domestic effect. 196 As Ganesh Sitaraman has noted,

some administrative

law commentators tend to over-generalize

and

exclude international agreements from consideration because the APA
carves out "foreign affairs" from some of its accountability mechanisms. 197
Increasingly, however, scholars from outside administrative law have called
for greater attention to the processes through which U.S. agencies make
international law - a first step in recognizing the work of TEAs in making
both international and domestic law. 198 For example, some scholars have
advocated making U.S. international lawmaking more like administrative
lawmaking. 199 The same administrative law blind spot exists in trade more
generally. In earlier work I have discussed how administrative law punts
when it comes to trade agencies. 200
To reflect on the administrative state without considering the role of
TEAs is analogous to examining civil procedure without studying
alternative dispute resolution. While different in form, the latter is another
mechanism to achieve the same outcomes to which the former aspires.
Similarly, the legal force of TEAs can be commensurate to normal federal

194 See Claussen, Multple Pathways, supra note 10, at 274-78.
195 Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C.
500-04, 551-59, 561-84, 591-96, 701-06).
196 In fact, the foundations for this work were laid in scholarship more than a half century ago.
See, e.g., Frederick Davis, The Regulation and Control of Foreign Trade, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1428, 1428-29
(1966) (discussing how federal agencies direct the flow of foreign commerce); George Bronz, The
Tariff Commission as Regulatory Agency, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 463, 463-64 (1961) (describing the role of
what was then the Tariff Commission). Strangely, however, they have received little attention since
despite the boom in TEAs.
197 Sitaraman, supra note 142, at 493 (noting they are subject to arbitrary and capricious
review); see also Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 28, at 587-90.
198 See, e.g., Jean Galbraith, Make Treaty Implementation More Like Statutoy Implementation, 115
MICH. L. REV. 1309, 1349-62 (2017); David Zaring, Administration b Treasuy, 95 MINN. L. REV. 187,
237-41 (2010); Sitaraman, supra note 142, at 508-14; Richard B. Stewart, The Global Regulatory Challenge
to U.S. Administrative Lan, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 695, 696-97 (2005) (discussing international
regulatory regimes).
199 See generaly Galbraith, supra note 198; Hathaway, Treaties'End, supra note 11; David Zaring,
Sovereignty Mismatch and the Ne Administrative Law, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 59, 84 (2013).
200 Claussen, Trade Administration, supra note 67, at 902.
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rules, but the method for making them is not. TEAs are unorthodox

instruments in the administrative state and ought to be examined as
such. 201
By situating TEAs at the center of foreign commercial and regulatory
power, we may better understand the pathologies that may be at work in
their deployment. The processes behind them become paramount. 202
Policymakers then may return to delicate normative questions about
whether and how expert trade negotiators should be the primary expositors
of binding cross-border rules. Imagining cross-border regulations in this
way would be a significant departure from previous scholarly accounts and
orientations and could have institutional effects that reverberate across all
three strands of law, crystallizing their intersections.

C. Pathfinding
This Article has laid the groundwork for a lengthy multidisciplinary
research agenda. There remains a substantial task list building from the
empirical work set out here. To name just three such tasks: in the absence
of additional historical research, we do not yet fully appreciate the details
of TEAs' change over time. Likewise, in the absence of additional
qualitative investigation, we lack a sense of the role of bureaucrats as
compared to political appointees in TEAs' drafting and promotion, or how
interest groups and foreign countries activate and motivate them. These
details of TEAs' institutional evolution "all the way down" are critical to
capture before considering how they might be adjusted or institutionalized
differently. And until additional econometric work can be completed, we
do not have a clear sense as to how these TEAs influence trade volumes
and supply chain configurations.
This study also suggests more analytical research is needed in each of
the fields it implicates. With respect to international law, scholars and
policymakers ought to consider what TEAs tell us about the significance
of the concept of "agreement" in international law: how "agreements" are
being used or abused as quasi-legal instruments beyond the conventional
wisdom in treaty law, for example. Beyond the definition of "agreement,"
it draws attention to the additional work to be gleaned from seeing the
whole of the agreement life cycle - its authority and process for
negotiation (before), application, publication, and monitoring (during), and

201 See Abbe R. Gluck, Anne J. O'Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lanrmaking, Unorthodox
Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1791-96 (2015) (describing the emergence of unorthodox
legislative and agency practices in recent decades).
202 See Galbraith & Zaring, supranote 59, at 754-55 (commenting that "U.S. administrative law
was designed for purely domestic decision making," and does not map well onto the cross-border
regulatory instruments that make up much of our foreign commercial rules today).
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modification and termination (after). Likewise, this work has not explored
TEAs' legality under international law regimes, such as WTO law. 203
Domestically, this work only provides hints as to the likely problematic
delegations on which different administrations have relied, and only
anecdotally highlights some of the regulatory impacts stressed by reviewing
them as a collection. More work ought to be done to explore the full
impact of "rulemaking through agreement": to ask when notice-andcomment is best suited to achieve policy aims as compared to what can be
accomplished through agreement. Additionally, we do not have any
information about through what mechanisms TEAs are legally terminated.
That data would help us assess appropriate processes and notification
methods for doing so.
The constitutional questions loom large. First is the issue of the
authority upon which TEAs rely. As described above, there is little
inherent authority on which the executive branch could rely in foreign
commerce. Our work tracing each of these to an express (or implied)
delegation has only just begun. 204 Is this a story of congressional

acquiescence as the executive branch actors have boxed Congress out? Or
is there an informal dialogue occurring with members of Congress (or
their staff) to be unearthed rather than what appears to be tacit
acceptance? 205 How far does that stretch? Drawing lines around the limits
of TEAs is the important separation of powers work that waits. TEAs
expand executive power to strategically address functional gaps in
decision-making but sit in a legal quandary in what is supposed to be a
democratically responsive and constitutionally situated system. Further,
there is more to be explored as to their legislative or other form of
implementation.
There is also much to be gleaned here for the literature on

bureaucracies and their features, just as this contribution creates more
questions for scholars working in that field. Is this a story of bureaucratic
growing pains or is it representative of agencies simply doing their jobs?
As to the newly introduced concept of the foreign commerce bureaucracy,
203 See, e.g., Simon Lester, Questions about the U.S.-Japan Trade Agreement and GATT Article XXIV,
INT'L ECON. L. & POL'Y BLOG (Oct. 12, 2020, 7:36AM), https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2020/10/
(compiling
other
questions-about-the-us-japan-trade-agreement-and-gatt-article-xxiv.html
governments' comments on the U.S.-Japan deals); Simon Lester, The U.S.-Japan Trade Deal Can a
PoliticalAgreement Liberalize Trade Without Institutions, INT'L ECON. L. & POL'Y BLOG (Oct. 7, 2019,
6:03PM), https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2019/10/the-us-japan-trade-deal-can-a-political-agreementliberalize-trade-without-institutions.html (asking whether the U.S.-Japan deals violate WTO rules).
204 See supratext and sources in note 36.
205 See Joe C. Mathew, US CongressionalCaucus on India Co-ChairsAsk USTR to Expedite India-US
Mini Trade Deal, BUS. TODAY (Aug. 28, 2020), https://www.businesstoday.in/latest/economypolitics/story/us-congressional-caucus-on-india-co-chairs-ask-ustr-to-expedite-india-us-mini-tradedeal-271499-2020-08-28; see also Jesse M. Cross & Abbe R. Gluck, The CongressionalBureazracy, 168 U.
PA. L. REV. 1541 (2020).
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what problems may result from its lack of transparency beyond those
already identified here? Who has the authority to bind the U.S.
government? More broadly, what institutional design best enables the
United States to engage in international relations with so many competing
priorities among different agencies and expansive technical issues that

need to be coordinated across borders?
Finally, from a political science or international relations perspective,
we might look more closely at (1) the power structures and institutional
frames emerging and contributing to this landscape as well as who is
driving these frames, and (2) how TEAs influence norm development
outside of the United States. TEAs' geographic prevalence and expansive
topical coverage suggest something of an iterative relationship in our
"trade qua foreign affairs" engagements, ripe for more study. Is the United
States a rule maker or a rule taker through these agreements? Is this an
instantiation of a "Washington Effect" according to which foreign
bureaucrats change and adopt their systems to accommodate U.S.
regulatory aims? 206 If so, there could be highly significant norm
proliferation and institutional learning underway that could prove a
counterweight to the activities of non-allied rules regimes. 207
V. CONCLUSION
The body of TEAs comprises a substantial compilation of foreign
regulatory engagement across more than a dozen trade-related topic areas
previously unseen or unstudied. The more than 1,200 TEAs analyzed in
this Article permit the United States to resolve hundreds if not thousands
of foreign commercial issues. Continued and innovative use of these tools
has brought some new attention to precisely their bounds, but until now,
we knew almost nothing about them. This Article is the first to unearth
TEAs through original empirical assessment, and to consider the
implications - legal and practical - of doing foreign commerce this way.
Although I am cognizant of the risk of over-relying on TEAs'
functional benefits at the expense of other values, their widespread
application indicates at the very least that they merit a closer look. TEAs
appear at this first glance to make valuable contributions to trade law and
U.S. economic governance. Under the Biden Administration, which has

206 Cf ANU BRADFORD, THE BRUSSELS EFFECT: HOW THE EUROPEAN UNION RULES THE
WORLD passim (2020).
207 This effect could be akin to what advocates of the TPP sought to achieve, writing the rules
so China could not do so. See Barack Obama, President Obama: The TPP Would Let America, Not China,
Lead
the
Way
on
Global
Trade,
WASH.
POST
(May
2,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/president-obama-the-tpp-would-let-america-not-chinalead-the-way-on-global-trade/2016/05/02/680540e4-OfdO-11e6-93ae-50921721165d_story.html13.
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committed not to negotiate large scale trade agreements, there is a high

likelihood that TEAs will fill that gap. They will be the primary way that
the United States makes trade law despite their constitutional dissonance.
Given their prevalence, lawmakers and scholars ought to focus on
fine-tuning the system to account for the fact that TEAs form part of our
constitutional law story as well as of our administrative law toolkit. They
may not meet the mold of other executive or trade agreements, and they
may not resemble regulations in their form, but they are doing this same
critical governance work and they are likely only to grow in importance.
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APPENDIX

This Appendix outlines the steps taken to complete our twofold
search: identifying trade deals and then locating their full texts. It also
notes adjustments to the collection necessary for an accurate
representation of the empirical landscape.

A. Identification
Four trade agencies - the USTR, State Department, Commerce
Department, and the ITC - are among the agencies that make names of
trade agreements publicly available on their websites, creating easy access
to at least some lists of trade mini-deals. For example, before March 1 of
each year, pursuant to statutory requirements, 208 USTR produces the Trade
Poig Agenda and Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade
Agreements Program. In an annex to that publication, USTR provides a list
entitled "U.S. Trade-Related Agreements and Declarations." 209 This list is
not expressly required in the statute as a part of the Annual Report, but
copies of the Report dating back to 2000 are available on the USTR
website and all of them include such an annex. 210
In its 2019 Annual Report annex, USTR lists 648 agreements: 57
multilateral and plurilateral in force; 403 bilateral in force; 4 multilateral or
plurilateral not yet in force; and 21 bilateral not yet in force. 211 Also
included among the 648 are other agreements that include few to no
binding commitments: 73 multilateral arrangements of this sort and 90

bilateral. 212 The annex does not provide any information about its
selection process nor does it include links to or copies of the full text of
any agreement. 213 We found 124 of the agreements listed there to be listed

208 19 U.S.C. 2213.
209 See, e.g., OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2020 TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND
2019

ANNUAL

REPORT

OF

THE

PRESIDENT

OF

THE

UNITED

STATES

ON

THE

TRADE

AGREEMENTS PROGRAM, at Annex II. [hereinafter 2019 ANNUAL REPORT].

210 The USTR website and its archived website do not allow a user to click through to the
Annual Report for 2008, 2009, or 2011. For those years, I used the Wayback Machine
(https://archive.org/web/) to retrieve the Annual Report.
211 2019 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 209, at Annex II.
212 Id. Note that the 2019 Annual Report is the Report that was made available in spring 2020.
213 The list is divided into three sub-categories: "Agreements That Have Entered Into Force,"
"Agreements That Have Been Negotiated, But Have Not Yet Entered Into Force," and "Other
Trade-Related Agreements, Understandings, and Declarations." With respect to the first, USTR
states that these are "trade agreements entered into by the United States since 1984 and monitored by
the Office of the United States Trade Representative for compliance." Id. In fact, there are
agreements that go back earlier than that. See, e.g., Agreement on Trade Relations, Hung.-U.S., Mar.
17, 1978, T.I.A.S. 8967.
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elsewhere on the USTR website. 214 We also found an additional 225 traderelated agreements not mentioned in the Annual Report annex on the

USTR website.
The

State

Department

manages

the

primary

official

full-text

publication for treaties and agreements: Treaties and Other InternationalActs
(TIAS). TIAS is regularly updated, even if delayed and incomplete, and is
available on the State Department website. 215 It is populated by agencies
sending the State Department their concluded agreements - a process that
occurs pursuant to requirements set out in the Case Act. 216 The TIAS is
thus also a valuable source for identifying trade-related agreements and
includes their full text.
Like USTR, the State Department maintains or has maintained in the
past other websites with agreements apart from its formal TIAS
publication process. Two other State Department websites, no longer
maintained, make available agreements from the early 2000s that were
reported to Congress under the Case Act and not all of those are in
TIAS.217 The State Department also publishes annually Treaties in Force
(TIF), providing information on the status of treaties and other
agreements to which the United States is a party, including those that do
not appear in TIAS.218 Again, by their own language, these collections,
which include many types of agreements not just trade agreements, are not
comprehensive. Still, we reviewed all these publicly available State
Department resources for possible trade-related agreements and identified
246 additional such agreements there.
The Commerce Department maintains a website that contains a list of
trade-related agreements and copies of them mostly in HTML format.21 9
Commerce's Office of Trade Agreement Negotiations and Compliance
214 OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, HOME, http://www.ustr.gov.
215 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS SERIES (TIAS),
https://www.state.gov/tias/.
216 1 U.S.C.
112b(a) requires any federal agency that enters into an international agreement
on behalf of the United States to report the agreement to the Department of State within 20 days
after entering into the agreement. The Department of State must in turn inform Congress of the new
agreement within 60 days of its entry into force. Id.
217 See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, REPORTING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS TO CONGRESS
U.S. DEP'T OF
UNDER CASE ACT, https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/1/treaty/caseact/index.htm;
STATE, REPORTING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS TO CONGRESS UNDER CASE ACT,
https://2001-2009.state.gov/m/a/ips/c24150.htm.
218 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL

AGREEMENTS OF THE

UNITED STATES IN FORCE

ON JANUARY

1, 2020,

https://www.state.gov/treaties-in-force/. TIF lists the agreements to which the United States is a
party in any given year but does not provide their text.
219 U.S. DEP'T OF COM., TRADE AND RELATED AGREEMENTS DATABASE, at
https://tcc.export.gov/TradeAgreements/AIITradeAgreements/index.asp.
One
former
bureaucrat interviewed for this project believed there was an effort at Commerce to make a more
comprehensive list at the start of the Obama Administration. Interview with former USTR official 2,
Washington, D.C. (Feb. 18, 2021).
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claims that it posts "active, binding agreements between the United States

and its trading partners covering manufactured products and services."

220

We identified additional agreements through yearly reports from the ITC

entitled The Year in Trade.221 The ITC is an independent agency responsible
mostly for trade reporting and research, but also responsible for the
administration of different types of trade remedies processes, among other
tasks. 222 One of those primary tasks since its creation has been advising
Congress and the executive branch on what has been called since the early
part of the twentieth century the Trade Agreements Program. 223 The name
is used still today mostly to refer to FTAs that proceed through the fasttrack process. 224 Consequently, in recent years, the ITC has concentrated
its reporting on activities surrounding each of the 15 U.S. FTAs but earlier
reports note other types of agreements into which the United States has

entered. 225
My team and I also combed additional resources inside and outside the
government and from those sources we added several hundred more
TEAs. Among those additional sources, other U.S. government agencies,
apart from these four, discuss their international trade agreements on their
websites or in the Federal Register. 226 Agencies sometimes issue press
releases about an agreement not otherwise reported or available. 227 U.S.
presidents have acknowledged agreements in presidential proclamations. 228
Certain legislative reports mention agreements in passing, mostly historical
220 U.S. DEP'T OF COM., ALL TRADE AGREEMENTS, https://www.trade.gov/all-tradeagreements. Further, the Department states that it monitors the operation of over 250 agreements,
but it is not clear which ones. U.S. DEP'T OF COM., TRADE AGREEMENTS COMPLIANCE PROGRAM,
https://tcc.export.gov/tradeagreements_compliance/index.asp.
221
U.S.
INT'L
TRADE
COMM'N,
COMMISSIONS
PUBLICATIONS
LIBRARY,
https://www.usitc.gov/commission publications library?search=year+in+trade. At the time of
writing, the most recent publicly available report is the report from 2018.
222 See generaly U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, ABOUT THE USITC, https://www.usitc.gov/
press_room/about-usitc.htm.
223 See IRWIN, supra note 43, at 433-43 (discussing the origins of the program). The Trade
Agreements Program report (The Year in Trade) is submitted pursuant to the Trade Act of 1974 and
its predecessor legislation. Trade Act of 1974, supra note 71, 163(c) (codified at 19 U.S.C. 2213(c))
(the ITC "shall submit to the Congress, at least once a year, a factual report on the operation of the
trade agreements program.").
224 See, e.g., U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, THE YEAR IN TRADE 2018:

OPERATION

OF THE

OPERATION

OF THE

TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM, 70TH REPORT.
225

See,

e.g., U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, THE YEAR IN TRADE 1992:

TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM, 44TH REPORT 47-49, 59-73 (discussing TEAs with Japan, Korea,
and the EU).
226 See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS,
https://www.fda.gov/international-programs/international-arrangements; 38 Fed. Reg. 33,470 (Dec.
5, 1972).
227 See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. Beef Gains New
Market Access in Morocco (Dec. 6, 2018) (announcing an agreement with Morocco to allow imports
of U.S. beef).
228 See, e.g., Proclamation No. 4630, 93 Stat. 1477 (Dec. 15, 1978) (announcing an agreement
with Finland).
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and no longer in force. 229 Academic articles from the early part of the
twentieth century, especially in the American Journal of International Law,
occasionally catalogued what were then recent developments in trade
agreements entered into by the executive. 230
Throughout our search process, I also added TEAs that I came across
in my general research and based on my past practice experience. For
example, I also worked with librarians from the Library of Congress,
National Archives, and Congressional Research Service. Other scholars
kindly shared their relevant data sets as well. 231
After exhausting public and personal sources, my team and I then
consulted commercial services which provide access to still more
agreements with a subscription. HeinOnline maintains a commercial
database of international agreements known as the Kavass Collection,
named for its founder and principal collector, containing trade and other
agreements, and the accompanying Kavass Treaty Index. 232 A team of
Hein staff assisted in reproducing materials available in the Hein
collection. 233 Another commercial entity, ThomsonReuters/Westlaw,

maintains a Customs and International Trade Treaty Collection (updated
through summer 2018) that also contains a list of agreements related to

customs and international trade. 234
Determining whether a document created binding or non-binding law
was another challenge, but not an exclusionary one. That is, non-binding
and cooperative documents count as "agreements" in my definition just as
they do in international law more generally. 235 The unifying factor among
documents added to the collection is that they are representations of

229 See, e.g., Senate Report 2001, stipranote 177,passim.

230 See, e.g., A list of the Commercial Treaties and Conventions and Agreements Effected by Exchange of
Notes or Declarations, In Force Beteen the United States and Other Counties, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 196 (1928).
As explained below, I excluded many of these mostly due to their unavailability.
231 I thank in particular Oona Hathaway for sharing results of a Freedom of Information Act
request to the State Department for cover memos of executive agreements sent to Congress under
the Case Act from 1989-2016. Seegeneraly Hathaway, Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 36. The list of
memos generated through that work included references to four trade-related agreements that were
not mentioned in any other source.
232 HeinOnline, Kavass Collection, at https://home.heinonline.org/titles/World-TreatyLibrary/KAV-Agreements/. There are more than 22,000 agreements in the Kavass Treaty Index,
which contains the TIAS, U.S. Treaties, the U.S. Treaty Series, the Executive Agreement Series, and the

Kavass Collection.
233 Thank you to Dan Rosati, Chris Czopp, and Ana Derosa for their assistance in facilitating
our receipt of several hundred trade-related agreements. The Hein collections produced roughly an
additional 150 unique agreements (another 200 or so were excluded because they were amendments
or extensions). Approximately 350 agreements we had identified from other sources were also
available in Hein, which helped expedite the subsequent collection process.
234 This database is a subset of another database once was known as the Oceana collection
which is described by Oona Hathaway in her earlier work before the collection became entirely
inaccessible. See Hathaway, Treaties'End, supra note 11, at 1254 n.44.
235 See Aust, supra note 111, at 46.
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shared government views on certain themes or actions (or non-actions) in
a document with a foreign government. 236 Where this becomes most
difficult is in the many joint reports and outcomes of meetings that
governments occasionally announce as "agreements." 237 Those documents
are sometimes but not always included in this set, depending the details
available. 238 In total, this process yielded a list of 1,438 agreements by fall

2020.239
Thereafter, I excluded certain agreements that some of these datasets
include but were "not trade enough" for purposes of this project. The
capacious definition of "trade" today makes empirical line-drawing
challenging, even while it increases demand for these instruments. For
example, the ThomsonReuters database includes as customs or trade
agreements several dozen agreements related to air transport. 240 The
primary purpose of these agreements is to govern the relationship between
the U.S. Federal Aviation Authority and foreign flight administrations, as
well as to permit U.S. commercial carriers to have access to foreign
airports. 24 1 They are focused on the safe passage of commercial jetliners.
There is a similar set of agreements also governing maritime transport.
Such agreements mention in typically a single article or part of an article
that these commercial carriers will not be subject to customs review upon
arrival at these respective airports. Thus, while they do include a brief
reference to customs, they are air transport agreements that briefly
mentioned trade, whereas the bulk of the agreements in my collection

govern trade issues as their primary topic area or are considered by trade
agencies to be part of their purview. In the same spirit, I excluded
agreements that are unmistakably related to defense - even if they had to

236 It does not include purchase or similar contracts, however. My design choices in this
respect track the State Department's decision-making process on whether something is an
"agreement" for purposes of publication or reporting to Congress except that I include non-binding
agreements, whereas 22 C.F.R. 181.2(a) does not.
237 See E-mail from USTR official 4 to Isabelle Janssen, Research Assistant and Student, U. of
Mia. School of L. (June 15, 2020, 1:15:50 PM EDT) (on file with author).
238 A joint declaration such as that described here would be included if a government agency
labeled it as an agreement. Also, if there was an announcement of agreement in the public space
without more, i.e., without the text, I could not guarantee a threshold level of formality and
commitment, so I would not include such agreements. In those instances, I could not be certain that
the agreement was reduced to writing which was imperative for the project.
239 Since concluding the calculations in this Article, my team and I have received an additional
294 agreements - either because they were recently identified from additional sources or because the
agreements were only concluded in late 2020/early 2021 - of which 191 remain under our review for
possible inclusion and analysis at the time of publication of this Article. Thus, the total number of
agreements for consideration could be closer to 1629.
240 In another example of the ill-defined boundaries of trade law, the State Department also
makes these agreements available but, unlike Westlaw, does not classify them as trade agreements.
See, e.g., Agreement between the United States of America and Gabon, May 26, 2004, T.I.A.S. 04-526
(classified as "Aviation: Transport Services").

241 See, e.g., id.
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do with trade in arms or drugs; those sorts of illicit trade were not of
foreign commercial interest.
There are still other agreements that are closer to ideas of foreign
commerce that had to be carefully parsed. Examples in this borderline
category include fisheries agreements, health-related agreements, taxation,
and agriculture. 242 For these categories of agreements (so-labeled by
external sources), my team and I reviewed nearly every text individually to
make a determination as to whether they were "trade enough." The
guiding question for this exercise was whether the regulation of crossborder commerce was among the agreement's primary goals. 243
Further, my original collection swept in many amendments and
extensions of trade deals that I did not count as unique agreements in the
calculations presented above. 244 I excluded agreements that crept into the
larger collection that were not properly "executive" such as any FTAs,
friendship, commerce, and navigation treaties (FCNs), bilateral investment

treaties (BITs), and other treaties that had been inadvertently included. 245 I
also removed settlement agreements from WTO cases.
Two other sets of agreements posed a denotational challenge:
suspension agreements and VRAs. Suspension agreements are agreements

that may be concluded by the Commerce Department in a trade remedies
investigation in which the Department agrees to suspend the investigation
in favor of a deal with foreign exporters or a foreign government that
seeks to eliminate the unfair trade practice or limit its effect. 246 VRAs are
agreements to limit exports from one country to another. 247 I included

242 Agriculture is particularly challenging as the form of agreements related to agricultural
commodities has changed over time from what once were agreements that would meet my criteria
for inclusion to ordinary purchase contracts that I excluded. Compare Agriculture Trade Development
and Assistance Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-480, 101, 68 Stat. 454, 455 (authorizing the president to
enter into agreements regarding agricultural sales and other issues) with 7 U.S.C.
1701 (2018)
(authorizing the president "to provide for the sale of agricultural commodities to developing
countries and private entities for dollars on credit terms, or for local currencies (including for local
currencies on credit terms)").
243 The ability to differentiate between "trade" agreements and other regulatory agreements is
made still more difficult by the fact that certain databases and sources only apply a single category to
an agreement or only allow a user to search by top-level subjects. Further, those subjects are not
consistent across those resources.
244 I did not intentionally collect extensions and amendments and most of the time I
purposefully excluded them, but some inevitably appeared among the collection and then were
discounted for purposes of these statistics. They were helpful, however, to determine whether an
agreement was in force and could themselves be counted as separate deals, particularly when they
make substantive changes. I am looking at these more closely in a separate project on Executive Trade
A1thorty (in progress).
245 See John F. Coyle & Jason Yackee, Reviving the Treaty of Friendship: Enforcing International
Investment Law in U.S. Courts, 49 ARiz. ST. L.J. 61, 62 (2017) (describing BITs, FCNs).
246 See, e.g., 19 U.S.C.
1673c(b)-(c); Agreement Suspending the Antidumping Duty
Investigation on Fresh Tomatoes from Mexico, Sept. 19, 2019.
247 See Djavaherian, supra note 44, at 102.
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VRAs when they were obviously state-to-state agreements, but I excluded
suspension agreements and likewise non-state-to-state VRAs due to their
ambiguous intergovernmental status. 248 With this variation and trade's
fuzzy boundaries in mind, I cast the net widely. I collected a wide-ranging

set of documented U.S. commitments with trading partners and eliminated
some of this overbreadth in later stages. For some statistics, and for
historical purposes and analysis, having the wide set of trade-related
agreements as background proves useful.
Following my exclusion of those agreements that were not "trade

enough" or otherwise did not meet the criteria as identified above, 1,225
agreements remained. It is the set of 1,225 that was analyzed for purposes
of the calculations in the Article.
To be sure, all the statistics presented here are undoubtedly
underestimates. The lack of comprehensiveness in the numbers is not only
the result of the transparency challenges involved, but also because there is
a Matryoshka effect at play within the data. 249 This is especially true in
official treaty sources and in HeinOnline. I discovered that what in several

instances may be seen or counted by a database as a single agreement is
actually a compilation of several agreements in one. If one looks below the
surface of the first few pages, one may find several more agreements
embedded in a single PDF. Take the Trade Relations Agreement of 1992
with Albania, for instance. 250 This agreement is available in the Kavass
Collection but upon inspection, the PDF file with this agreement contains
not just the original agreement, but also multiple letter exchanges some of
which have further addenda and annexes. 25 1 In some instances, those
letters modify the original agreement, but most are separate agreements
within themselves and under my ordinary criteria, would constitute
independent agreements. These types of anomalies dot the collection and

248 Some commentators have asserted that the publicly known VRAs are only a small fraction
of the true number. See Warren H. Maruyama, The Wonderful World of VIRAs: Free Trade andthe Goblet of
Fire, 24 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 149, n.2 (2007) ("[The story of VRAs] is necessarily incomplete
because governments that negotiated VRAs were often careful to hide their tracks. No doubt, there
are many more VRAs hidden in obscure boxes and aging file drawers of government records"). For a
case study on alternative types of agreements among government and non-government entities, see
Guillermo Garcia Sanchez's terrific and illuminating forthcoming work on Inter-InstitutionalAgreements
(manuscript on file with the author).
249 Matryoshka dolls are the Russian nesting dolls that contain other dolls which contain other

dolls.
250 See Agreement between the United States of America and Albania, Alb.-U.S., May 14, 1992,
T.J.A.S. 12454.
251 Notably, many of the agreements identified informally, unexpectedly, or through unofficial
sources also create a challenge for citation, especially when the goal of citation is to permit a reader to
locate the document herself. The Bluebook at Rule 21 invites authors to "cite [to] another unofficial
treaty source"; in some instances, creativity was required in that respect and agreements may not be
available apart from my personal contacts. THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION

Rule 21 (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 21st ed. 2020).
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had to be addressed on a case-by-case basis - representative of so many
aspects of these specialized and understudied agreements.

B.

Collection

To find the text of these agreements, I began with full text official
treaty sources. The TIAS is one such source; it contained texts for 21
percent of our collection. But finding the full text, especially once official
sources were exhausted, required highly detailed investigative research led
by an expert library team. 25 2 We checked additional commercial sources
such as Bloomberg Law, the Kavass Collection, and Westlaw. 25 3 We
carried out Advanced Google searches on each missing agreement. We
used other websites like the Organization of American States website that
had some copies of agreements not available elsewhere. 25 4 We reviewed as
many foreign government websites as possible using our team's language
skills. Through these detailed web searches, official sources, and
commercial databases, the team was able to locate nearly 79 percent of the
texts.
For the remainder, I used personal contacts to try to fill in the gaps.
For nearly every agreement that my team was unable to locate online and
that had been identified in the USTR annex, I approached the USTR
official responsible for that country or another contact with subject matter
oversight.255 In the case of a small handful of agreements, I contacted the
lead author of the USTR annex or former USTR staff. In many instances,
these individuals helped us identify where one or more agreements could
be located, but more often than not, not even these bureaucrats had copies
of the agreements. 256
I sent also targeted queries to colleagues at other U.S. agencies

252 Librarians Bianca Anderson and Pam Lucken went above and beyond, assisting me with
processing these huge swaths of information daily for more than a year. Their stellar guidance and
contributions were invaluable to bringing this work to fruition.
253 Despite multiple e-mails to ThomsonReuters/Westlaw, we were unable to obtain additional
information or copies of the full text of the materials; however, based on their titles, it appears that
many if not all of the agreements in the Westlaw collection are also available in HeinOnline.
254 See, e.g., Agreed Minutes on Fuel Economy and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Regulations, S.
Korea-U.S.,
Feb.
10,
2011,
at
http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/USA_KOR/Negotiations/
AgreedMinl_11_e.pdf.
255 I chose to approach staff directly rather than file a Freedom of Information Act request for
these documents that would have likely taken several months to process, if not longer. Based on my
past practice experience and in light of my personal contacts, approaching responsible staff likely
yielded the same result.
256 This is by no means a criticism of these civil servants. As noted above, USTR and other
government agencies suffer from major recordkeeping problems despite federal records rules. On
multiple occasions during my time in government, we were unable to locate historical records due
mainly to turnover and a lack of institutional memory. At least three former USTR staff interviewed
for this project have communicated the same experience to me.
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including the FDA and USDA. USDA maintains a collection of nonpublic TEAs, often called "work plans," that govern the terms of the
import and export of certain agricultural products. 25 7 Although work plans
are not available on the USDA website, in a rulemaking in 2007, USDA
noted that they are available "by request." 25 8 My team requested a list of
and/or copies of the work plans for purposes of this project, but USDA
replied that the agency does not share them, contrary to its representation
in the Federal Register. 25 9 Despite USDA's unwillingness to provide me
with this information, I was able to get a partial list of such work plans
with Mexico with the assistance of a colleague who had access to Mexican
government information, 260 and came across one concerning Taiwan in a
law review article. 261
I then approached certain foreign governments' trade ministries
through personal contacts to see if they had copies of these agreements. I
sent targeted queries to trade experts with whom I had personal
connections in other countries. I also sent out the list of agreements we
were missing to a group of experienced trade practitioners. Across nearly
all of these engagements, very few additional agreements (only about 5
percent) were located. 262 We still do not have the text for 213 agreements.

257 See, e.g., Work Plan for the Export of Peaches, Nectarines, Plums, Interspecific Plums,
Apricots and Interspecific Apricots from the United States to Mexico with Quarantine Treatment,
Mex.-U.S., date unknown.
258 72 Fed. Reg. 39,482, 39,484 (July 18, 2007).
259 E-mail from Abbey Powell, Acting Chief of Staff, Plant Protection and Quarantine, Animal
and Plant Health Inspection Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture to Kathleen Claussen, Associate
Professor, U. of Mia. School of L. (June 22, 2020 at 13:36 EDT) (on file with author).
260 Thanks are due to Guillermo Garcia Sanchez who shared information he received through
a request to the Mexican government for all agreements with the United States. In comparing notes,
we discovered that the list the Mexican government provided to him and the list that my team and I
had developed from the U.S. side were both incomplete. Telephone Interview with Guillermo Garcia
Sanchez, Assistant Professor, Texas A&M School of L. (April 28, 2020).
261 See Hungdah Chiu, Su Yun Chang, List and Text of Agreements Concluded between the American
Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the Coordination CouncilforNorth Amercan Affairs (CCNAA) in 1993, 12
CHINESE (TAIWAN) Y.B. INT'L L. & AFF. 623, 634 (1994) (providing the text of the Work Plan for
Taiwan Mango Treatment and Preclearance, Taiwan-U.S., Apr. 28, 1993).
262 In other words, not even foreign governments were able to locate these. Some colleagues
speculated they may be available in now-inaccessible paper archives. See E-mail from USTR official 5
to Kathleen Claussen, Associate Professor, U. of Mia. School of L. (July 14 at 12:06AM EDT) (on
file with author).
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